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The gravitation towards mobility-as-a service in railway transportation system can be
achieved at low cost and effort using shared railway network. However, the problem
with shared networks is the presence of the level crossings where railway and road traffic
intersects. Thus, long waiting time is expected at the level crossings due to the increase
in traffic volume and heterogeneity. Furthermore, safety and capacity can be severely
compromised by long level crossing closing time. The emphasis of this study is to
optimise the rail-road level crossing closing time in order to achieve improved safety
and capacity in a heterogeneous railway network. It is imperative to note that rail-road
level crossing system assumes the socio-technical and safety critical duality which often
impedes improvement efforts. Therefore, thorough understanding of the factors with
highest influence on the level crossing closing time is required. Henceforth, data analysis
has been conducted on eight active rail-road level crossings found on the southern corridor
of the Western Cape metro rail. The spatial, temporal and behavioural analysis was
conducted to extract features with influence on the level crossing closing time. Convex
optimisation with the objective to minimise the level crossing closing time is formulated
taking into account identified features. Moreover, the objective function is constrained
by the train’s traction characteristics along the constituent segments of the rail-road level
crossing, speed restriction and headway time. The results show that developed solution
guarantees at most 53.2% and 62.46% reduction in the level crossing closing time for the
zero and nonzero dwell time, respectively. Moreover, the correctness of the presented
solution has been validated based on the time lost at the level crossing and railway traffic
capacity consumption. Thus, presented solution has been proven to achieve at most 50%
recovery of the time lost per train trip and at least 15% improvement in capacity under
normal conditions. Additionally, 27% capacity improvement is achievable at peak times
and can increase depending on the severity of the headway constraints. However, convex
optimisation of the level crossing closing time still fall short in level crossing with nonzero
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”In science, when human behaviour enters the equation, things go nonlinear.
That is why Physics is easy and Sociology is hard.” Neil deGrasse Tyson
1.1 Problem Statement
Rail-road level crossing is a point of shared responsibility between the railway and
road traffic. However, there is a high risk of train-vehicle or train-person collisions
at these interfaces. In South Africa, there are over 9000 authorised rail-road level
crossings [13]. Rail-road level crossings are safety critical in addition to their socio-
technical characterisation. As a consequence, there is gradual development on the level
crossing safety and capacity improvements due to the dual characterisation. The rail-
road level crossing involves a considerable number of human elements. Therefore, safety
at level crossings not only depends on technology but also on the human behaviour.
Although, automation remains the most viable solution thorough understanding human
and technology is essential.
There are two forms of rail-road level crossings, passive and active. Passive rail-road level
crossings are equipped with the stationary warning signs as means of protection. Studies
have indicated that frequency of incidents at active rail-road level crossing far exceeds
that at passive rail-road level crossing [12, 15]. This has led to an increasing reluctance in
upgrading passive to active rail-road level crossings. However, in some cases stationary
warning signs are not adequate to provide the neccesary protection. On the other hand,
1
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active rail-road level crossings employ flashing lights and barriers to warn road users of
the approaching trains. At both forms of rail-road level crossings, trains are given first
preference because of the railway operational requirements. In addition, speed restrictions
are imposed for the railway traffic.
Furthermore, there are no specific rail traffic operations at passive rail-road level crossings
this leaves road users responsible for their safety. Conversely, active rail-road level
crossings use two points of interests in controlling the protection mechanisms namely
activation and deactivation points. Activation point triggers the deployment of the
level crossing’s warning and protection system. Similarly, deactivation point signals the
withdrawal of the warning and protection. Thus, system which is responsible for safe train
movements uses track occupancy supervision to trigger and withdraw the level crossing’s
protection system. Hence, operation of active rail-road level crossings depends on the
train detection system.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to meet high level of performance and safety in
the midst of the challenges facing the rail-road level crossing system. Thus, trade-
off is made between safety and performance. The trade-off often falls short when the
user specification is not well defined. In South Africa, railway transportation assumes
most of the responsibility concerning the rail-road level crossing. The dire consequence
of the unequal responsibility on the management of rail-road level crossings hinders
the achievement of a true user requirement specification. However, joint optimisation
of technology and human element is essential on socio-technical systems such as level
crossings. Thus, without true user requirement specifications, improvement efforts seem
futile. The status quo of the manage-ment of rail-road level crossings may have been
successful in the past but it is no longer sustainable. Particularly, looking at the rate of
evolution of the transportation systems involved.
The failure of current rail-road level crossing systems to cater for the ongoing changes
in both rail and road transportation is evident. Moreover, safety at the rail-road level
crossing cannot be the end user’s responsibility. The rail and road transportation have
different functional and operational characteristics. In addition, modern trains and
vehicles have gotten lighter, faster and quieter over the years. On the other hand, human
reaction time is severely influenced by the high ambient noise levels in urban areas.
The increased population growth in urban areas implies an increase in transportation
demands. Therefore, long rail-road level crossing closing time is inevitable especially
2
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with an increase in traffic volume and heterogeneity.
Studies have shown that accidents at the level crossing follow different trend from the
normal road accidents. Thus, accidents at rail-road level crossing are mostly caused by
unintended or intended human error as opposed to excessive speeding or driving under the
intoxicated substances [12, 28]. Hence, a summary of human errors with high likelihood
of causing an accident at the rail-road level crossings are as follows.
• Belief and assumed knowledge of the road transport network, train movement and
the operation of the level crossing [15]. This can further be broken down into the
following
1. Blindness caused by the lack of attention which leads to failure to perceive an
object in plain sight [12].
2. Perceptual limitation resulting from the interference in human vision caused
by the sun glare [15].
3. Expectation – in most cases human beings are guided by their expectations
rather than the environmental stimuli. Thus, expectations that there will be
no train approaching the level crossing is evident in the increased likelihood
of failure to respond to level crossing protection mechanisms [12, 15].
4. Speed or distance perceptions - passing through the level crossing requires
accurate decisions with respect to the train’s speed and distance. This is a
complex perceptual process of the relative speed and distance of two objects
that are converging at different speeds and often at angles that are not always
perpendicular [15]. Hence, this decision-making process is highly vulnerable
to error [12, 15].
• Late detection of warning as a result of lapses and errors impeding decision making
process [10, 20]. Motorists and pedestrians can experience a delay in interpreting
warning of the approaching train late especially when barriers are excluded in the
level crossing protection system.
1.2 Research Rationale
It is evident that advanced technological solutions deployed at the rail-road level crossing
maybe impeded by uncontrollable human behaviour. Yet, the consequences of accidents
3
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at such systems include severe injuries or fatalities and damage to expensive rail assets
such as train and track-side equipment. Moreover, collisions at the rail-road crossing can
also result in the railway service disruption and traffic congestion. Thus, safety at the
rail-road level crossing relies on both technological advancement and appropriate human
behaviour in accordance with defined standards and traffic rules. However, level crossing
technical and human behavioural analysis do not always align.
Often, level crossing system’s safety is compromised by abnormal and degraded modes
of operation. Degraded mode of operation is the system’s failure to meet the level of
services expected by the operators due to intermittent or concurrent breakdowns. The
persistence of degraded mode over a long period of time results in the system defaulting
to emergency. Furthermore, system may operate under abnormal mode because of
unfavourable conditions such as severe weather conditions and increased traffic flow.
Thus, it is clear that efficient capacity utilisation of the railway network can be easily
achieved for homogeneous traffic as opposed to heterogeneous traffic.
On the other hand, railway infrastructure is costly to build and to maintain. Therefore,
shared railway networks are more sustainable than multiple networks catering for specific
homogeneous traffic. Shared railway network accommodates heterogeneous traffic such
as commuter, intercity and freight trains. However, heterogeneous railway track is
most likely to increase the rail-road level crossing closing time and deteriorate system’s
performance. In addition, fixed level crossing activation point will results in constrained
capacity of the railway infrastructure and traffic flow. Hence, this research addresses
the rail-road level crossing closing time in a shared railway network. The research
hypothesizes that optimal rail-road level crossing closing time in a heterogeneous railway
traffic can be achieved by joint optimisation of technical and human element. In addition,
direct dependency between technical and human elements need to be established in order
to achieve optimal level crossing closing time.
1.2.1 Research Objectives
The main objective of the study is to provide an optimisation solution to minimise rail-
road level crossing closing time such that it improves capacity and safety. The proposed
solution is intended for railway networks with heterogeneous traffic. Nonetheless, the
solution should still apply in a homogeneous railway traffic. Hence, the main objective
4
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of the study is fulfilled in the following steps:
1. Analysis of the level crossing’s spatial, temporal and behavioural elements.
2. Extraction and assessment of features influencing level crossing closing time.
3. Implementation of a convex optimisation solution based on the findings of the above
mentioned steps.
4. Comparison of the proposed solution to the existing solutions.
1.2.2 Research Outcomes
The present study aims to address the improvement of safety and capacity of the rail-
road level crossing through optimisation of the closing time. This shall be accomplished
by conducting spatial, temporal and behavioural analysis to identify factors contributing
to long waiting time at the level crossing. Thus, the objective is to minimise the level
crossing closing time taking into account the features extracted from data analysis and the
traffic heterogeneity. The conditions favouring the minimal closing time are formulated as
the constraints of the optimisation solution. Hence, this research is set to reduce time lost
at the level crossings by at least 50% for both heterogeneous and homogeneous railway
traffic. Furthermore, the logical correctness of the proposed solution shall be validated
as per CENELEC standards [14, 16, 17].
1.2.3 Scope and Limitations
The present study is limited to active rail-road level crossings in South Africa particularly
those in urban or metropolitan areas where there is an increase in rail and road traffic.
In addition, it is intended for heterogeneous railway traffic but it is still applicable to
homogeneous railway traffic. Data analysis shall be conducted on data collected from
homogeneous railway traffic due to unavailability of data at heterogeneous railway traffic.
Thus, necessary adaptation shall be applied to ensure that the proposed solution caters for
heterogeneous railway traffic. The solution shall not cover degraded mode of operation.




A brief outline of the thesis is given below:
1. Chapter 2 covers related works in rail-road level crossing system. Thus, existing
literature is broken down into sections covering operations, control, validation and
verification. The section on operations puts forth the constituent modules involved
in the level crossing operation. Furthermore, the section discusses applicable train
detection methods, their advantages and short falls. The role of train detection
in rail-road level crossing operation is also elaborated. In addition, the section
discusses the purpose and types of the protection system at the rail-road level
crossing. The section covering level crossing control outlines applicable level crossing
control strategies however an emphasis is on petri nets. The chapter concludes
with a brief overview of validation and verification methods applicable to the level
crossing system.
2. Chapter 3 details data analysis of rail-road level crossings located along the
southern corridor of the Western Cape metro rail. Data analysis is focused on
the extraction of spatial, temporal and behavioural patterns of the rail-road level
crossings under study. The chapter further illustrates how spatial, temporal and
user behavioural features impact safety at the rail-road level crossings. Thus, spatial
analysis presents road and rail based spatial features and assess of their impact on
the level crossing closing time. Hence, road-based spatial factors considered include
pavement condition, intersection angle, level crossing area and the visibility of the
events at the level crossing from the perspective of the road user. Similarly, rail-
based spatial factors include the presence of platform, rail profile, rail curvature and
length of island track/s. In addition, temporal analysis focuses on identifying and
assessing factors contributing to long closing time. At last, behavioural analysis
explore unsafe behavioural conducts of each respective users of the level crossing
and the factors contributing such behaviour.
3. Chapter 4 outlines the formulation of the proposed solution and results. The first
section of the chapter presents an overview of convex optimisation followed by the
formulation of the problem model. Optimal level crossing closing time is critical
in ensuring improved capacity and traffic control. Moreover, optimal level crossing
closing time has the ability to improve safety. The presented solution involves the
application of convex optimisation to minimise the impact of features influencing
6
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rail-road level crossing closure duration using ”cvx” solver in Matlab. Constraints
due to traction and braking characteristics of different train types and station’s
dwell time are taken into account. Furthermore, the solution is constrained by the
required headway time, safest minimum and maximum level crossing closing time.
Thus, two solution architectures for rail-road level crossings with zero and non-zero
dwell time are presented.
4. Chapter 5 presents validation and verification methods applied to check the correct-
ness of the proposed solution. Thus, demonstrating how the proposed solution
achieves improved safety and capacity. Any railway system or solution must be
subjected to rigorous validation and verification processes the same is applied to
the developed solution. The CENELEC standards such EN 50126, EN 50128 and
EN 50129 are the most applicable. However, due to time constraints only temporal
specifications concerning safety and capacity of the level crossing are checked. The
time lost at the level crossing is used to measure safety improvement. In addition,




This chapter discusses related works in rail-road level crossing control, operation and
validation. It further reviews efforts made towards safety improvement at the rail-
road crossings. The chapter is organised as follows, introduction is given in section
2.1. Operational requirements and methods of the rail-road level crossings is presented
in section 2.2, followed by the applicable control strategies in section 2.3. Applicable
validation and verification techniques are presented in section 2.4 followed by concluding
remarks in section 2.5.
2.1 Introduction
Railway signalling systems has an average life cycle of at least 20 years. However, the rail-
road level crossing system reaches saturation level within the first half of the stipulated
time. This results in the deterring system’s safety and performance. The railway traffic
shares the rail-road level crossing infrastructure with other modes of transport. Moreover,
continuous increase in transportation demands and evolution of the rail and road vehicles
is expected within the stipulated life cycle duration. Therefore, the increase in failure to
respond to warnings of the approaching train is no surprise. As a result, the level crossing
safety deteriorate thus the lives of other users is put in danger.
The rail-road level crossings have been found to increase the train’s travel time in the
network. In addition, rail-road level crossing accidents are the third contributor to
fatalities in the South African railway network [13]. This has led to the call for improveme-
8
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nts of safety at the rail-road level crossing. However, the socio-technical and safety
critical duality of the rail-road level crossing system often impedes improvement efforts.
Therefore, the shortfall comes from trading the system performance for achieving the
required safety integrity level [34]. This approach may show great success at the beginning
but it is not sustainable. Extensive literature on the improvement of safety at the rail-
road level crossing systems exits. Hence, the review of the existing literature shall be
categorised into the operation, control, validation and verification of the rail-road level
crossings.
2.2 Operation strategies
Railway train control system is the backbone of safe and secure operations of the trains
[51]. Thus, rail-road level crossings have separate operation strategy which feeds into train
control system. Intelligent control is critical in ensuring unified feedback between the train
control and level crossing systems [47]. Therefore, development of automatic train control
systems is at the forefront of providing safe train operation and overcoming the challenges
faced by the railway industry [19, 51]. Automated systems in railway are facilitated by
railway traffic management system based on the adopted operational methods, such as
fixed and moving block signalling systems [52]. The fundamental principle of railway
signalling systems is to maintain a safe distance between successive trains travelling in the
same or opposite direction [49, 52]. The safest distance is established by the signals used
to guide the trains or train localisation information available through cloud computing
[35].
While there is growing interest in automated train operation, there is a gradual developme-
nt in the optimisation of the rail-road level crossing operation. The study of rail-road level
crossing is intricate because it involves at least two modes of transports with different
operation and management. Furthermore, the rail-road level crossing system is safety
critical and socio-technical [7, 11]. The presence of the rail-road level crossings in the
network has been shown to increase the train travel time which impacts the capacity of
the network [8, 34]. In most cases the time delay caused by rail-road level crossing are not
assessed on day to day case, but only during design phase or in the event of an accident.
Rail-road level crossing controllers derive their inputs from the activation track circuits
to enable protection systems such as the siren, lights and barrier [8]. Therefore, rail-road




Train detection is achieved by application of various technologies such as track circuits,
transponders and odometric sensors explained in subsection 2.2.1. In addition, the
applicable level crossing control strategies and protection systems are outline in 2.3 and
2.2.2, respectively. It is often assumed that the train travel at the maximum allowed speed
on the approach or over the rail-road level crossings however it is not always the case. The
controller uses the train occupancy status of the activation track to warn and protect the
level crossing irrespective of the speed of travel of the approaching train. Hence, long rail-
road level crossing closing time is expected in the case where the train are delayed upon
occupying the activation track [8, 33]. Nikolajevs et al. proposed the measurement of the
train’s entry speed through the evaluation of the changes in inductance and impedance
of the track circuit [33]. Further, the rail-road level crossing closing time can be inferred
from the changes in inductance and impedance [8, 33].
The level crossing protection system is triggered as soon as the train is detected on
the activation track monitored by the block occupancy circuits [8, 31, 33]. The study
conducted by Nikolajevs et al found that the long closing time is attributed to the train
travelling at the speed significantly lower than the maximum permissible speed. Hence,
this is a result of activation being triggered at the same point for the train travelling at
maximum permissible speed and that travelling at significantly lower than the maximum
permissible speed [33, 34]. Thus, the first case will results in the lower closing time
than the latter [33]. The study proposed prediction of the rail-road level crossing closure
duration based on the train speed measurement either by additional sensors or evaluation
of track circuits impedance [33]. However, approach of additional sensing is often not
preferable due to cost of installation and equipment.
Several attempts have been done to reduce the rail-road level crossing closing time
without the need of additional equipment. Nogushi et al proposed the reduction of
the level crossing closing time using optimal rail-road schedule. Thus, optimal schedule
was calculated using a genetic algorithm such that time delay for each train at a station
is the gene value and the blocking time is the fitness value [74]. Hence, the applied
genetic algorithm of 30 individuals and 1000 generations generated the combinations on
the train’s departure time which reduces the level crossing closing time [74]. The study
confirmed that closing time reduced for changing combinations of the departure time
[74]. In addition, Alps et al developed a control algorithm for the rail traffic routes with
predefined schedule over the rail-road level crossing. The proposed solution showed that
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the rail-road waiting time can be reduced through the application of the genetic algorithm
on the calculation of the schedule taking into account the train’s location and speed [75].
Furthermore, the algorithm achieved an increase in traffic capacity at the rail-road level
crossing [75].
The secondary challenge with rail-road level crossings is managing and controlling traffic
bottlenecks in their presence. The impact of rail-road level crossing system on the railway
planning and operation is often significant and if not monitored may result in adverse
consequences [7, 22]. Planning and operating railway is a difficult challenge because of
the general complexity of the underlying discrete optimisation problem [50]. The process
of train timetabling involves minimising of process time. Thus, one need to consider the
section run-time, dwell time and headway time in the optimisation process. In addition,
train timetabling process must be satisfied to ensure feasibility and the scheduling of
trains to meet the passenger demand [23, 31, 50]. However, train timetable became
difficult to solve due to an increase in passenger demand and heterogeneity of train
service as well as geographical conditions [36, 50]. The increase in customer demand
for railway transportation services often results in oversaturated railway systems and
consequently leads to traffic bottlenecks [36]. Remedial actions can be applied to railway
traffic but it fails in increasing capacity distributions at the interface with other modes of
transportation. Timetable planning with heterogeneous railway traffic is a complex task
because of the different operational train properties [32, 37].
2.2.1 Train Detection
Train detection plays a critical role in the operation of the rail-road level crossings. Hence,
the level crossing controller input is derived from the track occupancy status defined by
the train detection system. Thus, train detection over the activation track serves as
the input on the controller which then actuates the level crossing protection. Similarly,
as the train clears the deactivation track the controller responds by withdrawing the
protection. The emphasis of this section shall be on train detection technologies other
than the axle counter. Thus, axle counter based train detection shall be discussed in




Figure 2.1: DC track circuit
Analog Train Detection
Traditional train detection involves direct current (DC) or alternating current (AC) track
circuits. In both methods, the railway line is divided into segments of varying length
called blocks. The blocks are co-joined by insulation joints in order to enable continuous
train detection as it transverse along the railway line. However, the required insulation
joints material is expensive to install and maintain [56]. Furthermore, insulation material
is prone to deterioration [56]. The train detection by DC track circuits is based on the
propagation of an electrical signal along the two rails, as shown in Figure 2.1. A resistor
in series with the DC source limits the current flow when the train is detected. Hence,
DC signal source is connected to the both rails on one side of the block and the relay
acts as receiver connected to the other side of the block, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
When the track circuit is unoccupied, the DC supplied by the source on one end of the
block will run along the rails and energise the relay located on the other end. However,
when the track circuit is occupied, the train axles connect the running rails together
resulting in a short circuit. This reduces the current through the relay and de-energises
it. Thus, track circuit can have any of the three statuses faulty, occupied and free.
These statuses are inferred from the comparison of the current measured on the receiving
end and the threshold current value. The set threshold current takes into account the
detection criteria and the losses under given operational condition.
DC track circuits are ideally applied on a non-electrified railway sections due to their
susceptibility to stray currents [56]. In addition, double-rail DC track circuits suffer
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Figure 2.2: AC track circuit
from the interference due to propulsion current generated and returned from the rails.
As a result, distance from the signalling point is limited by the leakage current flowing
through the ballast. The leakage current is generated by the attenuation of the applied
voltage between the rails [56]. Ballast is the rail bed on which sleepers (concrete/metal
blocks underneath the rail tracks) rest on. The second shortfall of DC track circuits is
the use of the fixed threshold for joint optimisation for train detection, broken rail and
communication breakdown [56].
AC track circuit technology was introduced to counteract the DC track circuit’s susceptibi-
lity to stray currents from the traction system. This requires the use of AC signal source
operating at frequencies above 60Hz such that interference from the 50Hz traction current
is avoided [55]. AC track circuit has an additional pair of impedance bonds for each pair
of the insulation joints, shown in Figure 2.2. The impedance bond comprises of the
centre-tapped inductance connected across the rails on both sides of the insulation joints
[55]. This provides continuity between the track circuits for the DC propulsion power and
propulsion current distribution. In addition, impedance bonds will maintain relatively
high impedance at the signalling frequencies between the two rails and adjacent track
circuits. Thus, AC signal transmitted propagates along the rails will energise the relay
at the other end of the track circuits when the track circuit is unoccupied. Similarly, the
detection of the train’s axles will result in the reduction of the current through the relay
thus de-energise it.
It is expensive to maintain insulation joints associated with AC track circuits. Thus,
the need for the insulation joints was eliminated by the introduction of high frequency
alternating current (HFAC) track circuits. In a HFAC track circuit, the edges of the block
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Figure 2.3: HFAC track circuit
are established by a special transformers connected to the rails as indicated in Figure 2.3.
These specialised transformers have single turn winding made of heavy copper bar stork
and a toroid core [55, 56]. Hence, transformer on the transmitter side operates at the
frequency of the transmitted signal whereas that on the receiving end operates at the
frequency of the receiver circuits. The receiver is an electronic circuit consisting of the
tuned filter, rectifier and amplifier to receiving the transmitted signal.
Train detection in an HFAC track circuit is established by either de-tuning the receiver
circuit or short-circuiting the transmitter or receiver or both. However, transmitted
signal is used to keep the track energised when the track circuit is unoccupied. HFAC
track circuit requires assembly of single transformer between adjacent track circuits. The
resonant windings for the track circuit and adjacent track need to be isolated as they
operate at different frequencies. Furthermore, isolation of the resonant windings require
blocks to be at least 800m long which is impractical for inner city railway network [56].
Henceforth, modulated signal with high spectral density was proposed to address the
HFAC track circuits limitations of isolating resonant windings [56]. This led to the
introduction of passive signalling devices (PSD) in train detection. Thus, PSD is a
switch which senses the current through the detection point when closed and has an
opposite effect when opened. The modulated signal includes pulse amplitude modulation
(PAM), orthogonal frequency division modulation (OFDM) and quadrature amplitude
modulation (QAM). A unique operating sequence is used for each detection point through
the application of a assigned duty cycle for occupied block, free block, broken rail and
communication breakdown functions [55, 56]. Communication between the adjacent
detection points is established by PSD modulating voltage or current from the neighbouring
detection points [56]. Therefore, the application of the modulated transmit signal in track




Intelligent train detection is the future and this is mostly accomplished by odometry
and binary coded track circuits. Odometry is the method of determining the position
or location of the train from the velocity and acceleration sensors mounted on the rail
or the train. Moreover, accurate train localisation by odometric system requires multi-
modal sensor network [61]. Therefore, odometric evaluation methods are compatible with
automation due to its reliance on the use multi-modal sensors in addition to guaranteed
safe, reliable and available services. Most of the applicable sensors include radar, cameras,
inertial navigation system (INS), radio frequency identification (RFID) and tachometer.
Thus, odometric evaluation requires large data acquisition and processing.
Large amount of data is required at a low acquisition rate defined by the analog to digital
converter (ADC). The application of ADC allows for maximum resource utilisation and
general purpose data acquisition [44]. Hence, different techniques such as direct ADC
and frequency to voltage converter based methods are applicable in data acquisition.
To make reference, the application of the wheel angular sensor in odometry involves the
computation of the wheel speed from numerical differentiation of the impulse counters. In
addition, wheel acceleration is estimated by subjecting the computed wheel speed values
to filtering [61]. As a result, voltage amplitude is proportional to the input frequency
whilst the frequency of the angular speed is proportional to the angular speed. Angular
speed signal is treated as an analog signal thus processing technique extract angular speed
from a logged data using direct ADC method [44]. Similarly, frequency to voltage method
converts the frequency of an angular speed signal into a voltage signal using frequency to
voltage circuitry [44]. However, the conversion method is inherently slow due to applied
averaging processes and inadequate capturing of the transient response [44].
State variable evaluation is the common system identification method applied in odometric
sensors. Thus, state variable evaluation involves identification of the current state of the
system and appropriate application algorithm [61]. This implies that a sensor in a fail
state cannot be used for estimation of the measurable. Hence, reckoning can be applied in
case of limitations in number of sensors, their configuration and operating environmental
conditions [38]. However, addition evaluation criteria must be applied. Tachometric is
one of the common evaluation criteria. It stipulates that the train’s wheels are in slid
or skid mode if the absolute value of the difference between the peripheral speed of the
wheels exceed the defined threshold value [61].
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In accordance with accelerometric criterion, train wheels are sliding if the absolute differe-
nce between the estimated and measured acceleration exceed a fixed threshold [61]. Thus,
slid mode is evaluated based on the comparison between the estimated and measured
wheel acceleration [44]. In addition, conditions such as the rail curvature, wet tracks,
fast acceleration and deceleration have been identified to have high slip or sliding effects
[46, 43]. Thus, slip or slide counteracts measures such as fuzzy logic and neural network
based anti-slipping control were proposed [46, 38]. Neural network based anti-slip control
is success when applied in estimation of the friction between the rail vehicle’s wheel and
the rail tracks [46]. Whilst, applicable fuzzy logic anti- slipping control methods include
re-adhesion algorithm nested with creep control and oscillation suppression control are
effective with the use of non-contact speed sensors such as radar, RFID and navigation
systems [46].
The primary objective of odometric evaluation is to provide train position, speed and
acceleration. Thus, train localisation is essential element of these measurements. Acceler-
ometer, angular speed, radar, navigational systems and optical sensors are amongst
sensors used in train localisation. To make reference, train’s longitudinal acceleration
can be used in odometric evaluation to derive the train’s position and speed by numerical
integration. This is achieved by accelerometer with low bandwidth so that it can be
able to measure train’s longitudinal acceleration with high sensitivity [44]. However,
vertical component of the acceleration will be measured since axle accelerometer is not
perfectly horizontal. This results in angular misalignment with respect to the horizontal
axis. Moreover, the angular misalignment is perpendicular to the sensitive direction of
the longitudinal acceleration measurement [61].
In order to increase the accuracy of the odometric estimation in critical adhesion conditions,
inertial mass units (IMU) are the best approach [38, 39]. IMU measures the three-axial
body frame acceleration and the three-axial body frame angular rate using its three-
axial accelerometer and a three-axial gyroscope [38]. This is to compensate for the
accelerometer’s sensitivity to gravity and centrifugal force [38]. Although IMUs gives
accurate measurements, they are also limited by the cost of acquisition and maintenance.
Therefore, reliability of the odometric estimation is dependent on the set of sensors used
and the required operative conditions [38, 39]. Conventional odometry algorithms have
proven to be sensitive against wheel–rail adhesion conditions and may fail in the presence
of high sliding [38].
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Thus, degraded adhesion conditions are critical for these algorithms. The performances
of wheel speed sensor-based odometry algorithms are influenced by the shape of the
measured wheel speed profiles at low adhesion coefficient [38]. However, wheel angular
speed sensors are highly reliable against slide and skid [46, 42, 40]. The wheel angular
speed sensor measures the peripheral speed of the train. Thus, precision of the odometric
speed estimation is dependent on the information of the wheel diameter (R) under the
non-sliding condition [42, 46]. Similarly, a combination of two angular speed sensors can
be used to determine and compensate the errors due to the wheel diameter as the wheels
are subjected to wear and tear [42]. Degraded wheel-rail adhesion (sliding) condition
corresponds to the train accelerating when the peripheral speed exceeds train speed.
Likewise, the train is braking when the train speed exceed peripheral speed [40].
Tachometers are relatively new in odometric train localisation. They are available in
capacitive, active and passive electromagnetic form however recent development are
focused towards optical form which less susceptible than the others [40]. Tachometers
are used in train position and velocity measurements. However, they are prone to errors
due to wheel slip and slide [42, 43]. Furthermore, they have high likelihood of resulting
in non-detection of the trains [40]. The only way to minimise failure modes is to increase
the number of sensors which is not always practical [40]. Alternatively, radar sensors
can measure the relative speed between the body they are mounted on and the surface
to which they are pointing to. The speed measurement is achieved by detecting the
frequency shift between the transmitted and the received echo reflected from object of
interests [46]. The advantage with radar sensors in odometric train detection is due
to being less susceptible to weather conditions and the time of the day. However, the
problem with radar is its dependency on Doppler shift which results in the variability
and uncertainty in the received signal from the rail track [46].
Conversely, high speed railway networks use satellite based navigation systems for train
localisation and speed measurements. These include the application of Global Positioning
System (GPS) which is similar to tachometer but have high precision and cost of acquisition.
At least four satellites are required for accurate target positioning within 5m-20m. Additio-
nally, error correction is required for ionospheric and tropospheric delays [42]. The major
shortfall with satellite based navigation system such as global position system (GPS) is
the outage of the GPS signals in tunnels and urban canyons [42]. The proposition of
inertial navigation system (INS) originated from addressing GPS signal outagea. Thus,
17
2.2. OPERATION STRATEGIES
INS measures the changes in position, velocity and altitude of the train as it transverse
along the rail tracks [42]. However, this approach is limited by the susceptibility to errors
and size of the sensors.
Last but not least, optical photoelectric devices are used to measure train’s speed in-situ.
This include camera which can directly identify and distinguish between the different
point machines and [48]. In application of camera, odometric method evaluates train
speed based on the movie frame count at-grade track or where landscape permits [46, 48].
Although, camera can contribute to accurate track selection it is less desirable for real-
time application since a fixed reference points on the video must be defined in order to
achieve precise measurements [48]. Alternatively, radio frequency identification (RFID)
can be applied. RFID determines the position of the train by the tags and reader. At
close proximity, the tag transmits signal and its identity to the reader which receives the
signal and identifies the tag [42]. However, large amount of RFID sensors are required
for accurate train speed and position measurement [42].
Digital Train Detection
Most railway signalling systems with automatic train protection (ATP) make use of coded
and binary coded track circuits. The coded track signal is sensed by a pair of coils
mounted underneath the train before the first set of axles. The sensing coils are referred
to as antennas. Magnetic field generated from the current running on the rails, induces
signal on the antennas [55]. Hence, this approach is compatible with DC or AC track
circuits. Moreover, signal on the track circuit is switched on and off at a rate at which
the speed command is received and interpreted by the on-board system [55].
In the application of coded track circuit with DC track circuit, transmitted direct current
running on the rails is modulated at desired rate on the other end of the block [55]. Hence,
wayside signalling elements on the receiving end will receive and decode track occupation
information. Similarly, in the application of AC track circuit switching rate is slower than
the frequencies of the transmitted AC signals. Therefore, many cycles of the AC signal
occur during the time interval that the code is switched on [55]. The relay is energised
when the code is received and this information is then used to control trackside signalling
equipment. The detection of the presence of the train will seize the operation of a relay
responding to the code. As a result, occupation of the block gets established.
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In contrast, binary coded track circuit work in conjunction with the high frequency
track circuit. The frequency of the track section is toggled between discrete frequency
values [55]. Thus, generated signal is referred to as binary frequency shift keying (FSK)
modulated signal. The FSK signal is then adapted to digital systems in which one
frequency is classified as a mark frequency corresponding to transmission of a ”1” and
the other classified as space frequency transmitting ”0” [55]. Therefore, train detection
is established when the amplitude of the signals at the receiver is reduced below the
threshold. The FSK modulation technique is trivial in digital signal processing due to
its immunity to noise from constant envelope [55, 60]. In addition, it has low probability
of error and high signal to noise ratio (SNR). Other frequency shift keying modulations
can be applied in the case where more than two discrete frequency values are required.
The modulation techniques referred to are quadrature frequency shift keying (QFSK)
modulation and M-array orthogonal frequency shift keying (MFSK).
2.2.2 Protection Systems
The rail-road level crossing protection system provides warning of the approach of the
train and secures the level crossing on the passage of the train. Moreover, the protection
system is distributes traffic capacity amongst the involved modes of transport. Barriers,
light, sound and object detection method can be used to protect level crossings. Although,
the protection system can make used at least one of the methods, multi-modal protection
system is most preferred. Multi-modal protection systems improve responsiveness to
the warnings [9, 15]. However, intelligent systems require additional object detection
technologies in the protection system [3]. Rail-road level crossings are characterised
as socio-technical systems due to the interaction of human element and technology in
operation. Therefore, it is important that level crossing protection reinforce safety amidst
technological limitatio-ns, human factor and spatial constraints.
Rail-road level crossing protection cannot be dealt without an understanding human
element. However, human element is complex and therefore difficult to successfully
assess. Amit et al argued that impact of human element at the rail and road interfaces
can be categorised into anatomical, personal, psychological and social attributes [15].
Anatomical attributes relates to age, fatigue level, cognitive, auditory abilities of an
individual user. Yet, personal attributes concerns the attitudes of individual users towards
the rules and others users of the rail-road level crossing. Psychological attributes emanates
from the stress and assumed knowledge of the operation of the level crossing system.
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Likewise, social attributes are as a result of crimes and conflicts effects on the individual.
Risk and accident analysis indicate that human factor impact is difficult to map its
causations accurately. Salmon et al presented a study on the dependencies between the
systemic and psychological factors in compromising safety at the level crossings following
Kerang crash.
Thus, systemic approach applied in the assessment of the Kerang level crossing crash
is based on safety being an emergent property of non-linear interaction between the
components of the system [5, 6]. The study argued that systemic safety approach at the
level crossing is dependent on the integration of the components of the system which
ensures that decisions made at higher governmental, regulatory and managerial level
is filtered through to the end-user of the system [6]. Furthermore, the psychological
analysis of the Kerang crash was conducted on a schema-based human cognitive and
behaviour method. Schema theory propose that individual possess mental templates
of past experiences which are mapped with the information in the world to produce
behaviour [6]. Therefore, schema allows individuals to orientate towards incoming stimuli
and adapt their response to it [6].
The schema based perceptual cycle model indicated that human failure to adhere to the
warning is attributed to various factors. Hence, the absence of physical barrier in the
protection system, truck driver obscured by the vegetation and truck driver’s failure to
respond to the sound alert (blown horn) of the approaching train were identified to be
critical in the cause of the crash [6]. However, there were also systemic failures identified
such a lack of educational awareness, delayed truck loading, inadequate inspection and
monitoring of the near-misses at the rail-road level crossing [6]. In addition, an observatio-
nal field study on motorist’s risky behaviours at the rail-road level crossing was conducted
in France. Thus, statistical analysis of the motorist’s behaviour was performed based on
three durations. The time at which initial warning is given, time at which booms start
closing and time at which booms are completely closed [54]. The level crossing protection
was organised in a way that initial warning comprising of flashing lights and sounding
siren until the booms close.
The analysis indicated that motorists tend to intentionally ignore the warning of the
approaching train within the first 2s of initial warning and closing of the booms [54].
Moreover, the likelihood of motorists intentionally ignoring warning was reported to be
high during daytime [9, 54]. A large sample of data showed that most motorists ignore
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warning from flashing lights and siren. However, they are more responsive to the barrier
based protection system. Furthermore, the rate of incompliance is high at peak hours
in the morning and evening [54]. The incompliance observed during the time at which
booms are closed included the ”zigzag” behaviour in half barrier based warning systems
[54]. The study indicated that about 50% of incompliance occur within the first few
seconds after the closure of the barrier [54]. Hence, the study recommended a shorter
clearance time for flashing lights and reduced barrier closure time in the event of more
than one train crossing [54].
In addition, rail-road level crossings are safety critical thus a loss any functionality can
have catastrophic effects. One of the technical factors affecting safety at the level crossing
is long waiting time [8, 31, 33]. However, the mode of operation of the level crossing system
could have adverse impact on the safety than long closing time [27]. Level crossings
systems are susceptible to abnormal, emergency and degraded modes of operation. A
level crossing system is said to in abnormal mode when operating under severe weather
conditions and increase in traffic volume. Thus, severe weather conditions affects the
rail and axle contact of the train and may consequently result in trains travelling slower
than normal and hence long waiting time [27, 29]. In addition, an increase in rail traffic
volumes may require the level crossing to remain closed for longer in order to allow all the
trains to safely pass. Therefore, level crossings with both long closing time and abnormal
mode of operation have high safety and capacity risk.
Conversely, degraded mode of operation results from the loss of critical functionalities
of the system such as loss of detection or malfunction of the protecting system [29, 30].
Human intervention is required to mitigate degraded mode of operation. Hence, the
system defaults to emergency mode of operation when either degraded or abnormal mode
persist over a longer period of time [27]. The system’s mode of operation may also
indirectly contribute to accidents at the level crossing. Furthermore, the co-existance
of the degraded or emergency with long closing at the level crossing could result in
catastrophic effects [29, 27]. It is therefore critical to consider the human behaviour
when designing the level crossing protection system. Moreover, continuous monitoring of




Figure 2.4: The application of petri nets in level crossing control
2.3 Control strategies
The level crossing control facilitates capacity distribution of the railway and road traffic.
Thus, various control strategies have been applied at rail-road level crossings. Most of
the control strategies applied focus mainly on the safety improvement at the rail and
road interfaces. Furthermore, increase reluctance in automation of the rail-road level
crossing system is attributed to limited support of new technological changes and unequal
responsibility between stakeholders. Railway transportation is faced with numerous
challenges such as capacity optimisation, energy conservation, cost reduction and reliability
of the services. Therefore, challenges of rail-road level crossings are often neglected due
to their urgency relative to other challenges and stakeholder engagement. Applicable
rail-road level crossing control strategies are discussed below.
Petri nets (PNs) modelling is the commonly applied control technique in rail-road level
systems. PNs are a set of mathematical modelling techniques for analysis of asynchronous,
non-deterministic, stochastic, parallel and distributed systems [2, 8, 21]. They can be
applied in system identification problems where state and algebraic equations are used
to model the system behaviour [18, 21]. However, their application in railway transport
ranges from performance evaluation, communication protocol, fault tolerance and human
factor assessment. Its variety of extensions such as Coloured Petri nets (CPNs), Timed
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Petri nets (TPNs), Stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) and Generic Petri nets (GPNs) makes
it strongly competitive over other control techniques. Petri nets contain places (marked
by circles) and transitions (indicated by blocks) connected by directed arcs, as shown
in Figure 2.4. Thus, places represent states or conditions or resources which need to be
met before an action may be taken out. Whilst, transitions symbolises the actions to
be taken based on the satisfaction of the states or conditions. Places may contain token
(indicated by the solid circle within empty circle) which move to their specified places
through execution or ”firing” of actions.
In PNs application, time is critical in most since most of the systems are non-causal.
Therefore , TPN associate time with places, transitions and arcs. Furthermore, it
is preferable to associate time with transitions as it represents activities [62]. This
allows for prioritisation of mechanisms whereby multiple transitions compete for the
same token and transition with highest priority is executed first [21]. Thus, application
of SPNs on the safety of the rail-road level crossing has led to the establishment of the
functional and dependability (ProFUND) modelling process [20, 21]. The objective of the
ProFUND modelling process was to harmonise different safety standards and establish a
cross acceptance benchmark across railway sector [21]. Though ProFUND modelling has
shown a great success in dealing with functional dependencies advancement can be made
to include human behavioural modelling through the application extended deterministic
and stochastic Petri nets [21].
Furthermore, Dutilleu et al. proposed the use of p-time Petri nets (p-time PNs) over the
TPNs in modelling and synthesis of the level crossing control system. Petri net model of
the train and level crossing processes were developed. The models are illustrated in Figure
2.4. Thus, p-time PNs control begins with the train sending the radio signal to the level
crossing. As a result, the train starts to brake whilst waiting for the acknowledgement
from the rail-road level crossing system [62]. The acknowledgement is a signal regarding
the safety status of the crossing. Thus, the signal is a confirmation that the level crossing’s
protection system is activated. Therefore, when the train receives acknowledgement from
the rail-road level crossing system, it will stop braking and proceed further [62]. Moreover,
the train is monitored from the level crossing approach until it safely exits. Once the
train has exited the level crossing, the signal is sent to the rail-road level crossing system
to release protection mechanisms (lights and barriers). Temporal constraints involving
the minimum (denoted by P12 in Figure 2.4) and maximum (denoted by P13 in Figure
2.4) closing time were imposed [2, 62]. The minimum and maximum closing time was set
to 9s and 240s, respectively. Henceforth, the level crossing closing procedure is cancelled
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should it not exceed 9s with an exception of overlapping movement of trains.
The introduction of geographical information systems (GIS) on the rail-road level crossing
control was proposed by Ishak et al. Thus, this feature addressed the gap in current
level crossing control mechanisms by incorporating the understanding of incidents and
precursors [21, 8]. Hence, GIS feature took into account the population rate, weather
conditions and incident and accident rate. The traffic density can be anticipated from
the population rate whereas the level crossing mode of operation could be inferred from
the weather condition. GIS in level crossing control allows for traffic capacity to associate
data to route segments and viewing of the selected routes. Furthermore, it allows for
projecting the impact area for accidental scenarios directly on the map and providing data
in real-time to emergency management in the event of an accident [21]. Thus, resulting
in an extended version of the Petri nets model for the level crossing by associating the
resources and system functions [20].
In contrast, the application of the deterministic and stochastic Petri nets (DSPNs) in
controlling road traffic at the level crossing was suggested by Huang et al. The model
was developed to address parallel road traffic at the rail-road level crossings. Therefore,
vehicles whose head is perpendicular and parallel to the level crossing zone were treated
as the direct critical scenario and indirect critical scenario, respectively. The urban
traffic lights were modelled by state charts which included eight, six and two phases
[64]. Furthermore, traffic light control system could only start if its signals are all at
danger or red state. The proposed solution was constrained by time delay of about 2s
for changing the phases in addition to simultaneous green signal for direct and indirect
critical scenario [64]. Thus, upper limit of the number of tokens that each lane in the
PNs hold correspond to finite capacity net [64]. Capacity constraint rule called the strict
transition rule ensured that the number of tokens in each output place does not exceed
the maximum capacity after firing.
Furthermore, DSPN model included rail-road level crossing control system with a single
and double track lines. Immediate transition firing was implemented for train detection
at the activation point of the single track line network [64]. However, a state was
implemented for double track lines in order to allow two different trains to simultaneously
pass through the rail-road level crossing system. In addition, inhibited arc was applied
to avoid train to train collision [64]. The control policy was used to avoid concurrent
direct and indirect critical scenarios in the event of dynamic alternation of the traffic
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lights while the train approaches the level crossing [64]. Thus, traffic control policy
dependent on the order of the traffic signal lights, triggering of signals on the approach of
the train and normalisation of signals as the train pass the crossing [64]. The limitation
with the DSPN model is the interruption resulting from the conflict developing between
simultaneous firing of the deterministic and immediate transitions [64].
A timed Petri nets (TPN) based control architecture for the rail-road level crossing has
been developed. The architecture was based on the global behavioural model formulated
from the various interactions of the involved sub-system’s dynamics. The interaction is
modelled from the detection of the train at activation point until exiting the level crossing
[2, 63]. Moreover, the model included time specifications for each process executed. The
level crossing closure cycle were modelled as a transition depending on the direction of
the approaching train [63]. Hence, the process to close the level crossing was triggered by
the firing confirmation of the required elements availability [63]. In addition, the model
prevented the short level crossing opening by ignoring confirmation with the absence of
the train at the entry or exit of the rail-road level crossing danger zone [63]. Furthermore,
control parametrisation involving the operational and safety requirements of the level
crossing were postulated. The imposed constraints were speed restriction of 160 km/h
within the rail-road level crossing area as well as minimal announcement delay and closing
time of 22s and 30s, respectively.
Thus, the model assumed passenger and freight train of the same length but restricted
to approach the level crossing at 140 km/h and 70 km/h, respectively. The control
system synthesis was based on the supervision limit, anticipated-announcement and time-
approaching announcement [63]. Hence, the supervision limit determined the earliest
location at which the anticipated announcement can be given to avoid short rail-road level
crossing [2, 63]. Conversely, anticipated announcement dealt with actual approach speed
of the train. Finally, train-approaching announcement ensured optimality by limiting
train announcement to 22s before it can reach the intersection zone [63]. The firing
intervals to the transitions of the TPNs depended on the speed of the train. Furthermore,
speed can be used to determining the delays of each train in achieving the required safe
separation distance at the level crossings [63]. However, the use of real-time dynamics
was recommended to improve results.
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2.4 Validation and Verification methods
Improvements can be quantified by validation and verification. Moreover, that the level
crossing system holds socio-technical and safety critical duality. Any loss of functionality
on the rail-road level crossings may have catastrophic consequences such as fatalities,
injuries, damage to assets and traffic disruptions [1, 15]. In addition, railway transportation
shares this infrastructure with the other mode of transport which has different operation
and management. Therefore, it is imperative that the rail-road level crossing systems
or their solution be subjected to rigorous validation and verification processes [65, 66].
Validation is process of testing the system’s functionality against the user requirement
specifications whereas verification concerns itself with the establishment of the validity of
system functionality. Limited literature exists in validation and verification of the level
crossing system due to commercial purposes.
Validation and verification techniques have been outlined for level crossing with automatic
protection system (APS). To make reference, Mekki et al presented validation and verifica-
tion method for level crossing with automatic train protection comprising of four train
sensors. Thus, three of the sensors were placed on the train’s approaching direction and
one on the exit direction of the rail-road level crossing [65]. Furthermore, anticipation and
speed sensor were placed prior to the train detection sensor to check train approaching in
the opposite direction [65]. As a result, the sensor arrangement was to avoid longer level
crossing closing time. Train sensor in the approaching direction detects the arrival of the
train and trigger the alarm for the warning lights to switch on and barriers to close [65].
Thus, train sensor on the exit direction detects the train leaving the level crossing area
generating an alarm to disarm ATS [65]. Henceforth, validation of the APS was based
on the short opening and long closing duration.
Automatic protection system is a time-constraint system due to the interaction of its
sub-modules and the required temporal specifications [65, 66]. Therefore, the solution
by Mekki et al suggested the extraction and population of APS’s time specifications into
the user requirement specifications. A repository comprising of the generic observation
patterns to watch all common temporal requirements and classify them according to
type was created. In the repository, each temporal specification was assigned an observer
or watchdog based on their property [65]. Hence, alidation and verification processes
were followed to check and analyse safety issues. Mekki et al proposed the use of
automatic techniques for verifying temporal logic of the transitions of the Petri nets
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or finite automata. This method has been proven efficient by theoretical proving but
Mekki et al suggested that it be complemented with further analysis. For instance, the
proposed model checker issue a Boolean type of output (true or false) which can be further
analysed to accurate assessment.
Furthermore, repository contained the identification and instantiation of the short closing
duration and long closing duration. Thus, short closing duration requires that the rail-
road level crossing be open for at least Tmin units of time which represents the period
of separation two successive closure cycle [65]. Therefore, short rail-road level crossing
closing time should be forbidden before pattern is to check if the global ”go down”
command is not executable before Tmin has elapsed [65]. A dichotomy search algorithm
was used to find optimal value for λ which is a distance corresponding to Tmin. Further,
a large value of λ guarantees that the requirements are met [65]. The rail-road long level
crossing closing duration is counteracted by setting the lower and upper bound of the
closing time [65]. Hence, in a case that the rail-road level closing time falls outside the
defined boundary values then requirement shall not be satisfied [65].
On the contrary, Dutilleu et al postulated two forbidden states in verifying the rail-
road level crossing time. These states originated from the time specifications within
a synchronisation structures and the presence of train at danger zone when barriers are
open [62]. The latter was evaluated by the continuous automata where automaton state is
described by a location and clock value [62]. In addition, the clock variable in automaton
is assigned to each transition while the arc transition corresponds to an activated clock
in a given location [62]. In order to avoid forbidden states, Cramer-Rao boundary was
formulated such that the upper and lower bounds do not include the forbidden states [62].
Therefore, safety control was synthesized based on the interoperability of the networks
[62]. However, the proposed method is limited by the insufficiency of the controllability
of the transitions under the forbidden states in order to block evolution of time [62].
Hence, current developments are looking into the application of petri nets to validate the
correctness and unavailability of the safety critical states [21].
Janota suggested a multi-agent system (MAS) model to validate and verify delays of the
rail-road level crossing’s warning system and the length of the approach section. The MAS
model comprised of several autonomous, interacting agents which collectively were able
to achieve a goal that is impossible for an individual agent to achieve [25]. Hence, MAS
represents traffic at the rail-road level crossing as a system giving instruction to hundreds
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and thousands independent agents (road vehicles, trains and pedestrian) all operating
concurrently [25]. The behaviour of individual agent and system can be observed at
micro-level and macro-level, respectively. Verification showed that the highest train’s
entry speed have no delay on protection system but requires the approach section to
be furthest from the level crossing [25]. Similarly, the lowest train’s entry speed have
extended delay on the protection system with the approach section being closest to the
level crossing [25]. This suggested that verification of optimal train’s entry speed is critical
in achieving minimal delay on the warning system at closest activation point.
2.5 Conclusion
Related works in rail-road level crossing system development have been presented. In
addition, this chapter has provided an overview of the operation, control, validation and
verification of the rail-road level crossing systems and solutions. Presented literature
has also on drawn the improvement efforts made and highlighted the existing gaps.
Although, human element has been identified as the leading cause of accidents at the
level crossing it is imperative that technical limitations are equally addressed. The
education, engineering and enforcement approach have been suggested in order to improve
safety at the rail-road level crossing. Yet, less effort has been made in determining
the relationship between long waiting at the rail-road level crossing and unintentional
violation of the traffic rules by users. Moreover, the underlying presented literature
point out the gap on the rail-road level crossing capacity and safety improvement with
railway traffic heterogeneity. Therefore, the present aims to address the gap through the




Level Crossing Data Analysis
This chapter presents spatial, temporal and behavioural analysis of the rail-road level
crossing systems. The purpose of the data analysis is to identify factors affecting safety
and capacity of the level crossings found on the southern corridor of the Western Cape
metro rail. In addition, the impact of the identified factors is illustrated and analysed.
The chapter is structured as follows. Introduction is given in section 3.1 followed by a
brief description of the topographical layouts of the rail-road level crossings under study
in section 3.2. The examination of the spatial factors is found in section 3.3. Furthermore,
analysis of the temporal factors is outlined in section 3.4. Behavioural analysis of the
train drivers, motorists, cyclists and pedestrians at the rail-road level crossing is presented
in section 3.5. Lastly, conclusion s given in section 3.6.
3.1 Introduction
The rail-road level crossing marks the point of shared use between the railway and road
traffic. However, it is also represent an accident hotspot to the railway transportation
system. Rail-road level crossings are socio-technical systems because of the recurring
complex interaction and interdependencies of human and technical elements. In addition,
the rail-road level crossings are regarded as safety critical. Thus, socio-technical and
safety critical duality of these systems is one of the reasons that they remain a challenge
to date. Thus, it is imperative to understand parameters of the rail-road level crossings
and their impact. In particular, considering the rate at which both the railway and road
mode of transportation are evolving. Railway transportation has limited control over
road users at the level crossings. Therefore, addressing systems such as these is critical
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to railway transportation if it is to improve its competitive advantage [13].
Thorough knowledge of the advantages and drawbacks of the rail-road level crossing
systems such is critical. It enables early detection of anomalies thus prompts quick
response. Moreover, it allows smooth improvement processes. The advancements in
transportation systems are directed towards mobility-as-a-service implying that there is
high likelihood of significant increase in the railway traffic capacity in order to meet the
user demand. However, an increase in railway traffic capacity is an anomaly which could
deteriorate safety and road traffic capacity at the rail-road level crossing if not addressed
in advance. Thus, studying incidents at the rail-road level crossing can be advantageous
in determining the safety risks. Nevertheless, it is equally important to explore other
elements or factors which may not be evident in risk assessment.
The existing literature has been focused in safety at rail-road level crossing but an
inclusive approach is required. Safety improvements approaches such as EEE (Engineering,
Education and Enforcement) and some have expanded this to 5Es (Enabling, Engineering,
Education, Enforcement and Engaging) have been proposed [53]. This led to the establish-
ment of projects such as SELCAT (Safer European Level Crossing Appraisal and Technol-
ogy). The SELCAT project has successfully established four detailed classifications of
accidents causes at the rail-road level crossings. The classes included rail-side human
causes, road-side human causes, rail-side technical causes, road-side technical causes
[53]. In addition, the project concluded that about 91% of the accidents are caused
by human factor. Furthermore, about 80% of these reported accidents are attributed to
inappropriate behaviour by road users [53]. The study further postulated that road user
behaviour can be intentional and unintentional. However, majority of the rail-road level
crossing accidents are due to intentional human error [53].
Therefore, it is imperative to conduct analysis of the rail-road level crossing before
any improvement can be made. Primarily because of the socio-technical and safety
critical duality of the rail-road level crossing systems. Hence, all elements must be
addressed in order to achieve best system outcomes. Moreover, customised approach
should be adopted when dealing with rail-road level crossing design and optimisation.
The variations at the rail-road level crossing plays crucial role in examining the protection
system efficiency. To make reference, the application of unimodal or multi-modal protecti-
on is specific to each rail-road level crossing system. Thus, the decision of which type of
protection to apply should be based on accurate knowledge of parameters of each rail-
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road level crossing system. In addition, efficiency of the level crossing not only depends
on the operation of the protection system but also on the controller capability. The level
crossings under analysis use track occupancy supervision control mechanisms. A brief
overview of the track occupancy supervision and the axle counter train detection is given
in 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, respectively.
3.1.1 Track Occupancy Supervision
In any railway network, train movements are monitored by track occupancy supervision.
The same process is applied in the control of the protection systems deployed at the rail-
road level crossings. The rail is segmented into finite track sections delimited by at least
two axle counters. Hence, train movement in the railway network is supervised by the
status of the track section. A track section can assume any of the three statuses at a time.
These are ’occupied’, ’free’ and ’disturbed’. The rail-road level crossing system control
is primarily based on the activation and deactivation tracks. Thus, protection system is
enabled when the activation track is ’occupied ’ and withdrawn when deactivation track
is ’free’. A ’disturbed’ track section does not trigger any action on the protection system
as the level crossing is already operating in degraded or emergency mode.
The layout of the level crossing system is depicted in Figure 3.1. The operational strategy
adopted for the level crossings under study involves preparing for the approaching trains
at most two signals prior to the crossing. According to the layout in Figure 3.1, protection
system is activated as the train is detected at ta and deactivated once the track section td
is ‘free’. Additional pre-activation conditions may require time delay on S1 and S0 upon
the occupation track section ts1 and ts1, respectively. The illustration of the sequence of
events as the train approaches the level crossing is shown in Figure 3.2. The red marked
segment indicates train occupancy and the green mark along the track sections indicates
anticipated train routing. A route has a departure and destination signal, and it is only
available once the departure signal is at a proceed aspect (yellow or green). Furthermore,
the passage of a signal at red (danger) is regarded as SPAD which is a serious non-
conformance in railway as it can result in train collision. Thus, elements (signals or track
sections) normalises when in not use to indicate their availability.
Signals (S0) located right beside the level crossing is termed the protecting signal. Therefo-
re, a signal S1 is limited to a yellow aspect to ensure that trains adhere to a speed
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Figure 3.1: Layout of rail-road level crossing
restriction of 30km/h when arriving at S0. As the train enters the activation track either
a track down or time release approach is applied. Thus, a track down activation approach
requires the train to occupy the approach track ta prior to clearing the protecting signal
or route over the rail-road level crossing. Similarly, time release is an extension involves
time delay on the signal whose approach track is occupied. The rail-road level crossing
indication changes colour to reflect its status. Time release is applied in a case where S0
and S1 placement does not support the required braking distance otherwise track down
is applied. The black indication on the level crossing reflects that the road users have
right of way over the level crossing, as shown in Figure 3.2. The level crossing marking
changes to yellow as the train occupy the activation track signalling the activation of
the protection system, as shown in Figure 3.2. Once, the level crossing is armed and
secured the indication stop flashing. Likewise, the indication changes to red when the
train enters the level crossing’s danger zone as depicted in Figure 3.2. Finally, the level
crossing normalises once the deactivation track td is declared ’free’ as shown in Figure 3.2.
The rail-road level crossing system is an open loop control system where the induced
voltage of the track section of interest serves as an input to the controller. Train detection
technologies sense the train as it traverses and send this information to the controller.
Henceforth, the protection system lowers the barriers in addition to warning lights and
siren. Latency time associated with lowering of the barriers is at most 10s under normal
operation. Whereas, flashing lights and siren provide immediate warning when actuated.
Studies have shown that reaction time of 2s is sufficient for the road users to respond
to the warning system [15]. Moreover, multi-modal protection system has been proven
proactive in ensuring safety at the rail-road level crossings [4].
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(a) Train at S1 of the level crossing (b) Train approaching the level crossing
(c) Train entering the level crossing (d) Train exiting the level crossing
Figure 3.2: Sequence of events occuring at the level crossing
3.1.2 Train detection: Axle Counting
Axle counter is the most applicable train detection in an electrified railway network.
Thus, axle counter use the count in and count out of the train axles principle in detecting
train [55, 57, 59]. Track occupancy is established when the train’s first set of axles are
detected and this status is assumed until the all axles are counted in are counted out
on the adjacent detector. As a result, at least two axle counter detectors are required
to successfully detect the train. The axle counter train detection overview is shown in
Figure 3.3. Thus, each detector is equipped with a transmitter and receiver to support
bidirectional train movement and determine the direction of travel. The axle counter
technology uses distortion on the magnetic flux linkage between the transmitter and
receiver coils to detects the presence of train [55, 57]. Therefore, status of the axle
counter track section is defined as follows:
Free: the number of axle counted in equals the number of axle counted out.
Occupied: the number of axles counted out is less than the number of axle counted in.
Disturbed: the number of axles counted out exceeds the number of axle counted in but
also include faults such as communication breakdown or power failure.
Furthermore, axle counter train detection system comprises of sensor coil, electronic
junction box and evaluator, as shown in Figure 3.3. Sensor coil consists of transmitter
and receiver coils. The sensor coil is mounted onto the rail to enable train detection.
The signal received from the sensor coil is conditioned by the electronic junction box
to necessitate axle counting. Henceforth, an evaluator determines the track status by
comparing axles count in and count out data. In addition, an evaluator communicates
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Figure 3.3: An axle counter train detection system
(a) Field pattern without axle wheel (b) Field pattern with axle wheel
Figure 3.4: Train detection by axle counter sensor
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the track status to the control room for track occupancy supervision. The axle counter
uses electromagnetic principle to detect the train. Magnetic flux is generated on the
transmitting coil and the flux flows through the path with low reluctance [55], denoted
by F1 and F2 in Figure 3.4a. As the train wheel is detected, magnetic flux get distorted
resulting in less flux flowing on the receiving coil [55]. This results in less induced voltage
on the receiver, as depicted in Figure 3.4b.
The passage of train axle is determined by continuous monitoring of the changes in the
induced voltage on the receiving coil relative to the set threshold voltage [55]. Therefore,
train detection is established when the amplitude of the induced voltage is less than the
threshold voltage. However, the effect of noise on the induced voltage could result in
detection failure. The difference in the induced voltage in the absence and presence of
train (δV ) has to be sufficiently large counteracted in order to reduce the noise effect
[57]. In addition, induced voltage on the receiver depends on the orientation of the coils
for accurate detection [57]. Though axle counters are unsusceptible to interference, they
susceptible to memory loss during power failure.
Moreover, the power failure on the axle counter has a potential to damage of the memory
circuit storing the occupation status of the track section [55, 57]. This can be catastrophic
when power failure occurs immediately after a train entered a new track section or a block
in the absence of backup power. In this case, the status of a track section is unknown
upon the restoration of the power and conditional reset is required to ensure safe transit
operation. The effect is minimal for simple and small railway network and adverse for
complex and large railway networks. In addition, the effect can be huge for safety critical
systems such as the level crossings. Particularly in the case where the power failure occurs
as the train approaches the level crossing.
3.2 Topographical layout
There are nine rail-road level crossings along the southern corridor of the Western Cape
metro rail, as shown in Figure 3.5. However, in this study only eight of these level
crossings are considered. In addition, these level crossing are within 20km section of
the entire corridor length of 45km. Topographical variation of the identified rail-road
level crossings is evaluated to assess operational and safety constraints. The schematic
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Figure 3.5: Southern corridor of Western Cape metro rail
layout and the operation of each of the level crossing are outlined. Railway signalling
system deployed at the level crossings under study supports bidirectional operation but
only unidirectional operation shall be considered. Hence, traffic directed to the right
shall refer to No.1 suburban line whilst traffic is directed to the left shall refer to No.2
suburban line.
3.2.1 Austell Road
Austell road is located in close proximity to the halt station (Heathfield) depicted in
Figure 3.6. This level crossing is equipped with warning lights and half booms for
protection. Thus, protection system is triggered by the occupation of the track section
3360T or 3962T on No.1 suburban line and No.2 suburban line, respectively. In addition,
the activation track section along No.1 suburban is at a platform of Heathfield halt station.
Deactivation of the level crossing’s protection along No. 1 and No.2 suburban line occurs
when the train exits track section 3460T and 3462T, respectively. The protecting signal
3440 has green as its highest aspect. This implies that trains are allowed to enter and
exit the level crossing at maximum line speed provided that speed restriction of 30km/h
is adhered over the level crossing. However, the system has no means to ensure that
speed restrictions are followed thus it relies on the driver to act accordingly. Similar
aspect conditioning applies along No.2 suburban line again it remains the train driver’s
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Figure 3.6: Layout of Austell road level crossing
responsibility to adjust the train speed based on whether the train stops or pass adjacent
platform.
3.2.2 White Road
White road level crossing is located in close proximity to Military road, as depicted in the
schematic in Figure 3.7. Its protection system comprises of two sets of flashing lights and
two half booms. Along No.1 suburban line, level crossing activation is triggered by train
detection over track section 4260T and deactivation is initiated once the train clears
track section A4760T. The occupation of track section 4762T and clearing of A4762T
along No.2 suburban line will activate and deactivate the level crossing’s protection
system, respectively. Furthermore, aspect conditionings on No.1 suburban line limits
train movement to at most 30km/h past signal 4740. In addition, a time delay of 15s is
imposed on signal 4740G after track section 4260T is occupied. This is to ensure safe
braking of trains for arrival at signal 4840. However, No.2 suburban line supports exit
of the level crossing at maximum line speed, provided that the train adhere to speed
restriction of 30km/h at the crossing.
3.2.3 Military Road
The point machine set (4821W and 4831W) add flexibility to the rail traffic by increasing
accessibility of the rail-road level crossing, as shown in Figure 3.7. However, point machine
presents discontinuity on the railway line which often limits the availability of the railway
network. Military road level crossing is equipped with two flashing lights and two half
booms as a means of protection. Hence, activation is triggered by occupation of track
section 4760T and 4862T along No.2 suburban line. Equally, deactivation is triggered
when a train clears track section 4831T on No.1 suburban line and track section 4821T
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Figure 3.7: Layout of White and Military road Level crossings
Figure 3.8: Layout of Uxbridge road Level crossings
on No.2 suburban line. Trains are only allowed to travel at cautious speed over the
crossing side of a point machine set in order to reduce wearing and tearing effect. Thus,
any crossing train movement shall have their depart signal at yellow aspect. Along No.1
suburban line, signal 4840 has a green as the highest aspect however due to the platform
being closer to the level crossing trains are unlikely to travel at maximum line speed
past signal 4840. Thus, it remains the train driver’s responsibility to adhere to the speed
restrictions. Train’s speed is limited to at most 30km/h along No.2 suburban to ensure
safe braking for arrival at signal 4762. An additional time delay of 15s before signal 4862
can clear upon the occupation of track section 4862T.
3.2.4 Uxbridge Road
Uxbridge road level crossing is protected by flashing lights and two half booms. Along
No.1 suburban, the protection system is enabled upon the occupation of track section
5260T and disabled when A5340T is cleared. However, along No.2 suburban line activation
38
3.2. TOPOGRAPHICAL LAYOUT
Figure 3.9: Layout of Albertyn Road Level crossing
is triggered by the train occupation over track section 5362T and deactivation is triggered
when the train clears track section A5342T. Highest permissible aspect for the protecting
signals on both lines is green. Furthermore, additional time delay of 15s is imposed on
signal 5340 and 5362 following activation trigger. The speed restriction of 30km/h over
the level crossing must be adhered in spite of the aspect displayed on the protecting
signal.
3.2.5 Albertyn Road
Albertyn road is protected by two sets of warning lights, two half booms and pedestrian
gates. It is located in close proximity to York road as depicted in Figure 3.9. The
occupation of track section 5960T and clearing of A6040T along No.1 suburban line
activates and deactivates the protection system protection system, respectively. Likewise,
train detection over track section 6062T initiates the level crossing activation whilst the
normalisation of A6042T deactivates the protection system along No.2 suburban line.
Signal 6040 is limited to a yellow with a time delay of 15s upon the occupation of the
activation track 5960T. Lastly, highest permissible aspect on signal 6062 is green thus it
remains the train driver’s responsibility to adhere to 30km/h speed over the level crossing.
3.2.6 York Road
York road is a pedestrian crossing equipped with two sliding gates within a barricaded
zone. As shown in Figure 3.9, the protection system is activated upon the occupation
of track section 6060T and 6162T along No.1 suburban line and No.2 suburban line,
respectively. Similarly, the protection system is deactivated when the train exits track
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Figure 3.10: Layout of Kalkbay road level crossing
section 6101T along No.1 suburban line and 6111T along No.2 suburban line. The
projected aspect sequencing for 6140 permits trains to depart protecting signal at maximum
line speed but with speed restriction of 30km/h over the danger zone. In contrast, signal
6162 only permits train movements at cautious speed to ensure safe braking for arrival
at signal 6062.
3.2.7 Kalkbay Road
Kalkbay road, shown in Figure 3.10 is protected by two full booms and two sets of flashing
lights. Hence, the protection system is activated as track section 6660T is occupied and
deactivated when track section B6740T is free of train occupation along No.1 suburban
line. In addition, level crossing activation and deactivation along No.2 suburban line is
triggered by the occupation of A6842T and normalisation of B6742T, respectively. The
protecting signals on both lines have green as the highest permissible aspect however
speed restriction over the level crossing still applies.
3.2.8 Beach Road
Beach road level crossing involves a single railway line, as depicted in Figure 3.11. Its
protection system comprises of two half booms and two sets of flashing lights. The level
crossing protection system is activated when a train occupies either 7742T or 8862T.
Similarly, the protection system is deactivated when the train exits track section A7742T.
Both protecting signals (7742 and 7762) have green as the highest permissible aspect, as
shown in Figure 3.11. However, additional time delay of 10s is imposed on signal 7742
upon the occupation of track section 7742T.
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Figure 3.11: Layout of Beach road level crossing
3.3 Spatial Analysis
The rail-road level crossing exists within the railway and road space. Thus, spatial
analysis is critical in determining the weakest point in the operating environment. The
aim of this analysis is to identify and assess the impact of physical factors on the rail-
road level crossing environment. Hence, in this study only common spatial features are
considered and they are characterised into road-based and rail-based. The road-based
spatial features include pavement condition, angle of rail-road intersection, level crossing
area and visibility of the level crossing’s protection or warning system. Similarly, the
presence of the platform at activation, the length of rail section in which the level crossing
reside, the rail profile and curvature are the rail-based spatial features considered in the
study.
Pavement conditions have been identified as a one of the causes of road accidents. Thus,
extensive literature has been focused on the examination of the relationship between the
road surface and traffic safety. The common road surface parameters are the rut depth and
the surface unevenness. Previous studies have reported that uneven road surface reduces
traffic safety in comparison to the presence of ruts [67, 68]. The pavement condition is
graded according to the rut depth and surface smoothness using three grades namely
poor, fair and good. A smooth pavement with no ruts is graded ‘good’ whilst the uneven
pavement with ruts is graded ‘poor’.
The angle of intersection between the rail and road tend to affect road traffic flow the
most. Moreover, large intersection angle may affect the visibility of activities happening
at the level crossing. Hence, elevation angle at the intersection of the rail and road is
extracted from Google earth pro tool. The rail-road level crossing area encompasses the
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boundaries of the road and rail. Thus, the traffic volume (railway and road) guides the
size of the rail-road level crossing. In addition, visibility of the level crossing is critical in
ensuring that road users respond appropriately to the warning system. Thus visibility is
characterised as ”obscure” if the train cannot be seen at activation point or ”clear” if the
opposite is true. The assessment of the road-based spatial features is listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Assessment of road-based spatial features
Level crossing Pavement condition Intersection angle LC area Visibility
Albertyn Rd Fair 2o 17.5m2 Clear
Austell Rd Good 20o 18.4m2 Clear
Beach Rd Good 2o 9.5m2 Clear
Kalkbay Rd Fair 25o 10.8m2 Obscure
Military Rd Fair 2o 24m2 Clear
Uxbridge Rd Good 1.5o 14.4m2 Clear
White Rd Fair 4o 19.2m2 Clear
York Rd Good 1.5o 4.4m2 Obscure
The assessment of the rail-based spatial features is listed in the Table 3.2. One of the rail-
based spatial features is the presence of platform at or in close proximity to the activation
point. A platform represents trains scheduled train stops. Therefore, the impact of
the platform is cross dimensional and it shall be analysed in the coming sections. The
significance of train detection in level crossing operation has been emphasized. Thus,
axle counter is dependent on the orientation of the transmitter or receiver coil which is
measured by the rail profile. Diameter (b) and height (a) of the mounting hole determines
the orientation of the axle counter sensor coil. Hence, continuous rail wearing and tearing
can affect rail profile and the orientation of the sensing coils. As a result, intermittent
detection failures or voltage drift warning is inevitable [59].
Conversely, rail curvature can result in train derailment as well as wear and tear the
rail. Furthermore, high rail curvature may affects train driver’s sight thus presenting
risk for SPAD incidents. Therefore, speed restriction is imposed at high rail curvature.
Although not apparent, the number of railway lines at the level crossing has an impact
on the closure duration. To make reference, simultaneous level crossing’s entry or exit
on multiple rail lines has less impact on closing time yet overlapping entry or exit has an
opposite effect. Finally, the impact of the length of the section bounded by the activation
and deactivation indicate the time spend at the rail-road level crossing per train trip.
According to data presented in Table 3.2 regarding the length of level crossing, trains
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should on average spend less than 60s over the level crossing. However, exception applies
for Austell and Kalkbay road.
Table 3.2: Assessment of rail-based spatial features
Level crossing Platform Rail profile (bxa) Curvature radius rail lines LC section length
Albertyn Rd Yes 14mm x 64mm 936m 2 163m
Austell Rd Yes 14mm x 63mm 351m 2 570m
Beach Rd No 13.5mm x 63mm 211m 1 110m
Kalkbay Rd Yes 15mm x 62mm 250m 2 484m
Military Rd Yes 14mm x 63mm 563m 2 204m
Uxbridge Rd No 12mm x 63mm 982m 2 135m
White Rd No 13mm x 64mm 112m 2 131m
York Rd Yes 12mm x 62mm 357m 2 110m
3.4 Temporal Analysis
Long waiting time has been identified as one of the technical factors contributing to
accidents at rail-road level crossing [33, 53]. Thus, long level crossing closing time is
evident at the rail-road level crossings with high road and rail traffic volume. This
analysis examines factors attributing to long level crossing closing time. It has been
reported that trains travelling at speed below expected maximum permissible speed and
the controller inability to ensure that all safety parameters are met at higher train speed
are the among factors contributing to long waiting time [31, 33]. The rail-road level
crossing closing time is measured by the time difference between the occupation of the
activation track and clearing of the deactivation track.
Temporal analysis of level crossings along the southern corridor of the Western Cape
metro rail is conducted. The current interlocking system (L905) has the capability to
record and report track side elements status in real time. Thus, track side elements such
as axle counters, signals, point machines and level crossing controllers constantly feedback
their statuses to the maintenance operator place (MOP) located at the central train
control centre (CTCC), as shown in Figure 3.12. Communication between the CTCC
and track side elements is facilitated by the interlocking module (IM) in the signalling
equipment room (SER). In addition, the data logger (DL) stores this information locally
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Figure 3.12: Thales L905 signalling system: Data flow diagram
and at the CTCC for backup.
Furthermore, interlocking system assesses the status and safety of events concerning
the track side elements on the request from the CTCC. This accomplished through a
bidirectional data transfer between the track side elements and IM. The same framework
is used to report the statuses of the elements to the data logger for storage. MOP can
displays real time events and statuses of the track side elements and replay history of
events.
For this analysis, log files from 22-03-2019 until 11-04-2019 were collected and analysed.
However, only axle counters involved in the rail-road level crossings is considered. Moreover,
time stamp associated with activation and deactivation tracks are used however the
analysis excludes track sections in faulty state. Furthermore, analysis is conducted using
python in the Jupyter notebook.
Temporal variation between the level crossings under study is critical in identifying key
elements affecting the closing time. The average closing times of the level crossing is
listed in Table 3.3. Hence, a notable difference between the calculated and expected
average closing time is observed. According to the level crossing topologies presented in
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section 3.2, the anticipated level crossing closure durations should range from 45s and
155s. However, most of the average level crossing closing time listed in Table 3.3 far
exceeds the expected results.
Moreover, the results presented indicate that on average about 24mins of the trip time
along the southern corridor is spent at the level crossings. As a result, passengers
are dissatisfied of the long travel time. Furthermore, there are safety and headway
implications. Headway time is a determinant of the capacity of the railway network.
It is defined as the time interval between two successive trains travelling in the same
direction. Headway time along the southern corridor with 10% tolerance amounts to
170s.
Table 3.3: Average level crossing closing time
Level crossing No.1 suburban: closing time(s) No.2 suburban: closing time(s)
Albertyn Rd 290.4520 294.4435
Austell Rd 62.9735 106.8115
Beach Rd 185.2390 185.2390
Kalkbay Rd 249.7490 281.1825
Military Rd 303.3535 101.8080
Uxbridge Rd 76.2045 62.9735
White Rd 167.1625 163.1150
York Rd 212.2138 212.6353
Total 1410 1266
In order to examine the extent of the temporal variation, level crossings are categorised
into two groups. The first group of level crossings has the average closing time below
headway time (170s) and the second group has closing time above headway time. Scatter
plot of the first and second group is depicted in Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14, respectively.
It can be observed that group 2 exhibits high irregularities in the closing time in comparison
to group 1. Moreover, majority of the rail-road level crossings categorised in group 2 have
platform at activation and time delay on the protecting signals in common. However,
the same feature is present in some of the level crossings in group 1 then what is it that
attributes a huge difference in the closing time between these groups.
Henceforth, the impact of the unique features in each class of the rail-road level crossing is
explored. Beginning with group 1, the effect of the presence of the platform on the at the
activation point on the level crossing closing time is shown in Figure 3.15. Austell road is
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Figure 3.13: Level crossing with closing time below 170s
Figure 3.14: Level crossing with closing time above 170s
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one of the level crossings in group 1 and it has the platform at activation only along the
No.1 suburban line. It can be observed in Figure 3.15 that there is a huge disparity in
the closing time along No.1 suburban line and No.2 suburban line. Moreover, the closing
time along No.1 suburban exhibits sporadic pattern. This can be explained by dwell time
associated with the platform. The time at which the train come to scheduled stop at the
station or halt station’s platform is called dwell time. Therefore, dwell time is dependent
on the passengers flow rate in and out of the train. It is evident in Figure 3.15 that dwell
time lead to irregularities in the closing time because it is not consistent with train trips.
In addition, time release imposed on the protecting signal is the second common temporal
feature in the considered level crossings. The effect of this feature on the group 1 level
crossings is depicted in Figure 3.15. The distinguishing feature between No.1 and No.2
suburban line of White road is the time delay of 15s imposed on the protecting signal on
No. 1 suburban line. Hence, this is evident by the small and uniform increase in the level
crossing closing time. The outliers are attributed by the train driver’s reaction time and
train’s speed on the approach of the protecting signal.
Lastly, some of the level crossings are approached from a scheduled stop on the closing
time. In this case, the platform is located on the approach track section of the signal
before the protecting signal (S1 in Figure 3.1). In group 1, trains approach Uxbridge
level crossing from a scheduled stop at Lake Side halt station along No.1 suburban line.
The irregular pattern on the closing time in Figure 3.15 is attributed to approaching the
level crossing from a scheduled stop. However, the irregularities is not extreme such as
in Figure 3.15. Approaching the level crossing at scheduled stop implies that the train’s
entry speed will be lower than expected.
Drawing attention to group 2 level crossings, as previously mentioned an absurd pattern
has been observed in spite of having the similar temporal features as the group 1. It
turned out that group 2 level crossings have at least two of these parameters co-existing.
In order to examine this further, the effect of the platform at activation and time delay
on the protecting signal is assessed. Albertyn level crossing has a platform and time delay
of 15s on the protecting signal along No.1 suburban line. The effect of dwell and delay
time is indicated by the prolonged and irregular level crossing closing time, as shown in
Figure 3.16. Likewise, the effect of approaching the level crossing from a scheduled stop
combined with time delay on the protecting signal is analysed.
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(a) The presence of a platform at the activation track
(b) Time delay on the protecting signals
(c) Approaching the level crossing from a scheduled stop
Figure 3.15: The effect of temporal features on the level crossing closing time
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Figure 3.16: The effect of dwell and delay time on the level crossing
Beach road is approached from a scheduled stop for train movement to the right in
addition 15s time delay is imposed on the protecting signal. Similar scenario is present
along Albertyn level crossing along No.2 suburban line. Results depicted in Figure 3.16
and Figure 3.17 show prolonged level crossing closing time but with less irregularities.
Furthermore, the results shown in Figure 3.16 indicate that the dwell time with time delay
on the protecting signal has greater impact than approaching the level crossing from a
scheduled stop with the time delay on protecting signal. Kalkbay road is the only level
crossing in group 2 which has no co-existence of at least two temporal features. However,
the only distinguishing feature is the application of the full booms in the protection
system. Thus, the effect of applying full booms in the level crossing protection shall be
elaborated on section 3.5.
The presented results suggest that irregularities in level crossing closing time are attributed
to the dwell time associated with activation track at the platform. Dwell time is one of
the constraints of the capacity of railway system. The challenge with dwell time is that it
is uncontrollable due to its dependency on the passengers flow rate. The analysis proved
that when associated with level crossings the impact on the railway system’s capacity
may be adverse. Moreover, the average level crossing closing time affects capacity of the
railway transportation system. The second temporal parameter contributing to longer
rail-road level crossing closing time is time delay on the protecting signal. Hence in this
case, an increase in the level crossing closing time is a compound of the time delay, train
driver reaction time and the required acceleration time. Lastly, the application of the full
booms on the level crossing protecting system tends to extend the closing time. Hence,
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Figure 3.17: Approaching the level crossing with time delay from a scheduled stop
this effect shall be explored on the oncoming section.
3.5 Behavioural Analysis
Rail-road level crossing system requires interaction of human and technical element.
Hence, the study human behaviour at the level crossing is critical in assessing the
safety and efficiency of the system. Previous studies have identified human element
as the leading cause to accidents at the rail-road level crossings. Thus, the objective of
conducting behavioural analysis is to add to existing literature by assessing the link of
the human and technical element with regards to the safety at the level crossings. This
analysis is limited to the behavioural assessment of the railway traffic operators, train
drivers, motorists, cyclists (or bikers) and pedestrians. Furthermore, only measurable
behavioural attributes are considered in this study.
Behavioural conduct of motorists, cyclists and pedestrians is extracted from the video
footage from the CCTV cameras. Each rail-road level crossing under study is monitored
by two CCTV cameras which are mounted on a mast pole of 2m above the road surface. A
week-long footage was used and objects detection software was applied to ease assessment.
Misconducts were manually extracted and recorded for analysis. The behavioural analysis
of railway operators was conducted on the GXD replay application available on the MOP.
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GXD functionality allows for replay of the operational events at the selected time and
location on the network. In addition, train driver’s behaviour is extracted from a sequence
of events following the point at which route is granted.
Measurable train driver’s behaviour includes responsiveness to protecting signals and
adhering to the speed restrictions over the level crossing. Hence, common unsafe acts
committed by train drivers are passing signal at danger (SPAD) and exceeding 30km/h
speed over the level crossing. Conversely, motorist’s behaviour is measured by the level
of response to warning given from the protection systems and refraining from stopping
within the level crossing demarcated zones (or danger zones). Similarly, behaviour of the
cyclists and pedestrians is measured by the ability to respond to warnings of approaching
train. Warning includes flashing lights, sounding siren and closing of barriers.
The rail and road traffic operate differently thus large traffic density can affect capacity
and safety at the level crossings. Railway traffic is dispatched in accordance with the set
timetable. In the case of the eight level crossing considered, trains are dispatched every
25mins in each direction at peak hours otherwise they are dispatched on hourly basis.
However, train timetable only holds when there are no train delays. Moreover, train
delays can be categorised into are primary and secondary. Primary delays are due to late
departure of trains and may affect train schedule by few seconds or minutes. Therefore,
no train cancellation may result from rescheduling due to primary delays. In contrast,
secondary delays affect the timetable by hours which often result in cancellation of other
train trips. Table 3.4 gives the average traffic density at the level crossings per busiest
hour.
The train passing signal at danger can be detected and recorded in L905 interlocking
system. Therefore, SPAD is evaluated from the reported statuses of the level crossing
protecting signals. Though train speed cannot be measured by axle counter sensors, it
can be inferred from the trajectory and train detection data. Thus, train’s speed can be
calculated from the length and time difference between the entry and exit of the level
crossing’s island track/s.
A daily incident report has been compiled in Table 3.5. Incidents are evaluated on
unsafe acts committed by each respective rail-road level crossing users. Passing the
signal at red and exceeding speed restriction over the level crossing by the train drivers.
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Table 3.4: Average traffic at the level crossings per hour.
Level crossing Trains trips Trucks Buses light vehicles Cyclists Pedestrians
Albertyn Rd 8 74 15 1500 35 700
Austell Rd 8 0 0 600 10 185
Beach Rd 8 0 0 490 15 100
Kalkbay Rd 8 0 0 650 1 200
Military Rd 8 30 21 3060 65 1574
Uxbridge Rd 8 0 0 850 45 250
White Rd 8 35 0 640 37 500
York Rd 8 0 0 0 0 300
In addition, road users are evaluated based on ignore the warning from the flashing
lights. Furthermore, motorists are evaluated on stopping within the demarcated level
crossing zone whilst cyclists and pedestrians assessed on crossing over closed booms.
Therefore, assessing the number of the reported incidents relative to the traffic density
and percentage of the incidents can give an indication of the safety level crossing.
Table 3.5: Incidents recorded at the level crossings.
Level crossing SPAD SR M - IWS M - SDZ C - zigzag C - SDZ P - zigzag P - IC
Albertyn Rd 1 0 69 145 13 1 35 20
Austell Rd 0 0 55 80 5 3 13 85
Beach Rd 0 0 34 55 5 3 19 13
Kalkbay Rd 0 0 125 45 8 10 50 22
Military Rd 0 2 661 292 23 6 156 1000
Uxbridge Rd 0 0 44 105 3 6 17 10
White Rd 0 1 60 47 4 11 54 185
York Rd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Where:
SPAD - Signal passed at danger by train driver,
SR - Speed restriction adherence by train drivers,
IWS - Intentionally ignoring warning,
SDZ - Stopping within demarcated danger zones,
IC - Illegal crossing of the railway tracks,
M - Motorists,




Figure 3.18: Incidents reported relative to daytime
Results presented on Table 3.5 show that railway sector conform to the level crossings
safety rules because train drivers account for less than 0.1% of the recorded incidents.
Train driver’s compliance suggests that systemic process in place and the ability of the
interlocking to detect unsafe acts such as SPAD plays significant role in ensuring safety.
However, safety at the level crossing requires all stakeholders to take part. In addition,
the results indicate that cyclists accounts for 2.8% of the incidents recorded. Similarly,
pedestrians account for 46.49% of incidents recorded whereas motorists accounts for 50.7%
of the recorded incidents. Assessing the number of incidents reported relative to the
traffic density indicate train drivers have 10.7% chance of causing an accident at the level
crossing.
Yet, motorists have 22.8% chance of causing accidents at the level crossing. Cyclists
and pedestrians are at high risk of being involved in the accidents at the level crossing.
Thus, cyclists account for about 48% risk of accidents at the level crossing whilst and
pedestrians account for 44%. It can be inferred that safety at the level crossing decreases
with an increase in traffic density. In order to emphasize this, comparison of safety at
Military and Beach road is conducted. Traffic density at Military road is seven times (7x)
higher than traffic density at Beach road. The risk associated with Military and Beach
road is 44.8% and 20.3%, respectively. Moreover, barricading the level crossing reduces
the risk of accident occurrence as evident on York road.
Train driver’s behaviour cannot be studied in isolation therefore it is critical to assess
the dependency between the railway traffic operators and train drivers. Reaction time of
the operators and train drivers at the rail-road level crossing is listed in Table 3.6. The
results at Kalkbay level crossing reveal inefficiency of railway operation at the rail-road
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level crossings. The attributing factor is that Kalkbay level crossing is manned due to
the deployment of the full booms. At the manned active level crossing, the railway traffic
operator at the control centre operates route for the train and prompts the operator at
the level crossing to close the barriers on the approach of the train.
Additional human element at a manned level crossing introduces delays which eventually
elongate the closing time. Therefore, manned active level crossings are less effective.
Furthermore, the results in Table 3.6 indicate that time delay on the protecting signals
and the application of automatic train routing (ATR) over the rail-road level crossing
with platform at the activation point have an influence on the train driver’s reaction
time. Automatic train routing algorithm sets the routes as per train schedule provided
the availability of the required elements. Therefore, ATR will set the routes over the
level crossing without checking that dwell time effect on the level crossing closing time.
However, an operator can choose not to set the follow up route where dwell time is
expected to increase level crossing closing time.
Table 3.6: Average response rate for rail traffic operation
Level crossing Traffic operator Train driver
Albertyn (down) 3s 5s
Albertyn (up) 2s 5s
Austell (down) 1s 6s
Austell (up) 2s 8s
Beach (down) 2s 7s
Beach (up) 1s 8s
Kalkbay (down) 45s 15s
Kalkbay (up) 41s 13s
Military (down) 2s 10s
Military (up) 1s 8s
Uxbridge (down) 1s 7s
Uxbridge (up) 1s 7s
White (down) 1s 4s
White (up) 1s 1s
York (down) 1s 1s
York (up) 1s 1s
To extend road user behaviour, incidents recorded before and after the passage of train at
the level crossing are analysed. Cumulative sum of recorded incidents within 60s before
and after the level crossing closure is presented in Figure 3.18. Results shown indicate
that the number of incidents increases during peak times. However, more incidents are
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Figure 3.19: Incidents reported against the motorist relative to daytime
recorded within the 16:00:00 and 19:00:00 compared to between 06:30:00 and 09:30:00.
Thus, there is some form of dependency between the increased traffic volume and human
behaviour. Hence, human behavioural aspects such as anatomical, psychological, personal
and social can be used to understand the disparity in the number of incidents at the two
peak times.
In addition, incidents committed by the road users are broken down to each respective
user. Therefore, incidents committed by motorists involve stopping within the danger
zones and ignoring warning given by flash lights. The results of average number of
incidents recorded in a day is shown in Figure 3.19. Thus, from the results it is evident
that motorists tend to ignore the flash lights warning than to stop within the demarcated
zones of the level crossing. Moreover, the number of incidents is high at peak hours. The
comparision of the motorist’s reponse to barrier and visual warning reveals that motorists
are more responsive to the barriers as oppose to visual warning. Nonetheless, warning
lights still serve an important role in the level crossing protection.
Figure 3.20 depicts the incidents committed by the cyclists within the stipulated window
period of 60s prior and after the passage of train at the level crossing. The incidents are
based on ignoring visual warning or flash lights and performing ”zigzag” manoeuvrings on
closed barriers. Again, the number of incident is high at peak times. However, between
07:00:00 and 10:00:00 cyclists tends to ignore visual warning as oppose to the barrier.
Yet, from 14:00:00 until 19:00:00 cyclists ignore both flashing and closed booms. This
behavioural conduct emanates from factors such as fatigue, fear and stress levels of the
individuals.
Pedestrians are evaluated on the criterion as cyclists. The number of incidents reported
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Figure 3.20: Incidents committed by cyclists relative to daytime
Figure 3.21: Incidents committed by pedestrians relative to daytime
is high at peak time particularly between 16:00:00 and 19:20:00, as shown in Figure 3.21.
The results illustrate that pedestrians have the same level of response towards flashing
lights and closed barrier. However, this trend is common at the rail-road level crossings
with longer closing time.
Often, multi-modal level crossing’s protection system is used to reinforce safety at the
rail-road level crossing. In the unmanned active level crossing, the deployment of the
protection system is initiated by the flashing lights followed by closure of the barriers
within 5s to 10s period. Therefore, the response level of road users to the level crossing’s
protection systems is examined by monitoring user behaviour for about 60s after the train
occupies the activation track. The obtained results are depicted Figure 3.22. It is notable
that both pedestrians and cyclists are not responsive to the warning given by flash lights
and barriers.
The lack of response by cyclists and pedestrians is evident on the number of incidents
committed after 20s has elapsed. This is a psychological phenomenon, which is often
stimulated by intolerance to long waiting time. However, it is seldom for motorists to
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Figure 3.22: Behaviour observed 60s after level crossing activation trigger
engage in unsafe act 20s after the initial waning of the approaching train. Therefore, it
evident that motorists are more responsive to barrier protection system compared to the
visual protection system. However, this highlights the failures in systemic processes to
reinforce safety at the rail-road level crossing.
3.6 Conclusion
The complexity of the rail-road level crossing system originates from the socio-technical
and safety critical duality. To add to this, is the reluctance to automated solution at the
rail-road level crossing. Data analysis conducted indicates that rail-road level crossings
are a safety and capacity concern. Furthermore, the outcome of the analysis reveals that
some human element at these infrastructures can be directly or indirectly attributed to
technical and environmental factors. Hence, rail-road level crossings with long closing
time are at high risk of accidents. On average, train spends on average 24mins of its
travel time along the southern corridor at the level crossings. This has implications on
the safety and capacity of the railway and road traffic. In fact, majority of the level
crossings have average closing exceeding headway time thus demonstrating the impact of
level crossings on the capacity of the railway network.
Data analysis has been conducted to identify spatial, technical and behavioural features
contributing to long closing time and compromising safety at the level crossing. Spatial
analysis have shown that the presence of platform at or in proximity to the activation
point have greatest impact of all the identified spatial features. Furthermore, the effect
of platform is a cross-dimensional that its effect has been proved in the temporal and
behavioural analysis. However, other spatial features can only have an effect under
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degraded or emergency mode of operation hence it is important to account for them
in the systemic process of the system mode of operation.
However, the findings of temporal analysis has illustrated that poor management of the
dwell time associated with platform at activation can results in long level crossing closing
time. Furthermore, approaching the rail-road level crossing from a scheduled stop has
some effect on the closing time. Therefore, this suggest that the dwell time effect is not
only observable at activation point but at the approach track of the signal before that
protecting the rail-road level crossing. In addition, imposed time delays on the protecting
signals have impact on the level crossing closing time. Finally, temporal analysis further
indicates that the co-existence of at least two mentioned temporal parameters have drastic
impact on both the safety and capacity of the rail-road level crossing system.
The study presented the assessment of the user behaviour. The railway operators and
train drivers have shown highest compliance to the rail-road level crossing rules. However,
the operators contribute to long closing time in manned rail-road level crossings. As a
result, train driver’s reaction to the protecting signal is affected by the delays introduced
by operator in a manned level crossing. Furthermore, train driver reaction is affected
by the time delay on protecting signal and the application of automatic train routing
over the level crossing with platform. Behavioural analysis indicates that unsafe acts
are common during peak times. In addition, the level crossing system susceptibility to
changes in traffic volume particularly at peak times.
Motorists have shown to be responsive to the barrier protection system as oppose to
flashing lights. In contrast, cyclists and pedestrians have shown to be less responsive to
both visual and barrier protection system. Evidence presented suggests that systemic
processes are critical in ensuring safety at the level crossings. To make reference, train
drivers are more compliant to level crossing rules compared to other users due to systemic
processes in place. Moreover, it is imperative to reduce time spent at the level crossings.
Hence, the proposed optimisation solution must take into account train’s entry speed,
dwell time management and time release of the protecting signals. In addition, the




This chapter presents a brief overview of convex optimisation, its implementation in the
level crossing closing time problem and the results obtained. The organisation of the
chapter is as follows, a brief introduction of convex optimisation is presented in section
4.1. Mathematical modelling and solution formulation is found in section 4.2 and section
4.3, respectively. Implementation is presented in section 4.4 followed by the results in
section 4.5. Concluding remarks are made in section 4.6.
4.1 Introduction
Application of optimisation techniques is common in railway transportation system. It
has been applied extensively in area of railway traffic management problems such as
scheduling and rescheduling. Moreover, modern automated railway systems are reliant
on optimisation techniques. However, in the case of the present study optimisation of the
rail-road level crossing is critical in ensuring optimal traffic control capacity and improved
safety. Hence, convex optimisation is applied to find an optimal rail-road level crossing
closing time for a heterogeneous railway traffic.
Convex optimisation was first introduced in late 1940s as a special case of linear programm-
ing. Its breakthrough is embedded on three methods named the simplex method, method
of central sections and method of circumscribed ellipsoid. In 1947, simplex method was
introduced for solving linear programming problems fitted on the scheme presented in
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equation 4.1. These problems involved a feasible vector x for which Ax ≤ b form a
polyhedron in Rn [70]. A polyhedron may or may not be bounded but if bounded it
is called convex polytope. By mathematical definition, a polyhedron is an intersection
of finite number of half spaces. Hence, a linear function on the polyhedron set is at
maximum at one of its vertices [45]. This implies that the maximum value of the linear
function can be obtained by the largest value on the set of vertices.
However, the set of vertices can be large for real applications. Thus, systematic search
method is required and it must be based on the assumption that the vertex is known and
nondegenerate [73]. This means that n ”linearly independent” inequalities of the vertex
become equalities without any loss of generality [41, 45, 69].
〈c, x〉 → sup,
n∑
i=1
cixi → sup (4.1)
〈aj, x〉 = bj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 〈aj, x〉 ≤ bj, j ≤ n+ 1 (4.2)
The vector aj = (aj1, ....., ajn), for j = 1, .....,m form a basis of Rn in nondegeneracy. This
means that the matrixAn = (aij)1≤i,j≤n is nonsingular. Thus, by letting b = (b1, ....., bn) ∈ Rn,
then polyhedron is given by
Anx = b = (b1, ........, bn)⇐⇒x = An−1b (4.3)
Solving out equation 4.3 reduces to
An
Tλ = c (4.4)
Where: An
T is the transpose of An .
Applying the optimisation problem of a feasible vector x in (Ax ≤ b) and λ = (λ1, ....., λn,0....0)
results in the following nontrivial solution of the homogeneous system.
〈c, x〉 = 〈AnTλ, x〉 ≤ 〈c, x〉 (4.5)
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Alternative possibility is obtained by allowing λ < 0,
〈a2, y〉 = ... = 〈an, y〉 = 0 (4.6)
However, due to the nonsingular nature of An then 〈a1, y〉 is nonzero as shown in equation
4.7.
〈a1, y〉 = −ε < 0 (4.7)
Thus, for the small values of t > 0 the following is obtained
〈aj, x + ty〉 < bj, j = 1, j ≥ n+ 1, 〈aj, x + ty〉 = bj, 2 ≤ j ≤ n (4.8)
If the vector x is feasible then the following should also be feasible
〈c, x + ty〉 = 〈c, x〉+t〈c, An−1(−ε, 0, ..., 0)〉 = 〈c, x〉+t〈(An−1)T c, (−ε, 0, ..., 0)〉 = 〈c, x〉−tελ1
(4.9)
This implies that 〈c, x + ty〉 > 〈c, x〉 for all t > 0. However, if the x + ty is feasible for all
t > 0 then the supremum of the problem is +∞. Otherwise, 〈aj, x + t0y〉 = bj for some
value t0 of t for j ≥ n+ 1 such that x + t0y is equivalent to x. This is known as the
nonsingular nondegenerate simplex method for numerical optimisation.
It was late in 1962 that the method of central section was developed as an algorithm that
minimise a sum of exponentials (with positive weights) on a compact polyhedron [70].
The problem was posed as finding the minimum of a convex and quasi-convex function
f on a finite-dimensional convex body A as expressed in equation 4.10.
f(x)→ inf ;x ∈ A (4.10)
Equation 4.10 denotes a general problem of convex optimisation. If A is denoted by
A1, then the centre of gravity of A1 is given by x1 = grA1. Therefore, the solution is
attainable if and only if f
′
(x1) is a zero vector. However, for the nonzero case then part
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= {x|〈f ′(x1), x− x1〉 > 0} is eliminated. For convex f , then
it can be shown that f(x)− f(x1) ≥ 〈f
′





f(x) > f(x1) >min{f(x)}.
If ξm point of (x1, ..., xm) is chosen such that f(ξm) is less than any values of f(xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Then, f(ξm) tends to the minimum of f on A and the error on f decreases at the rate
of a geometric progression. Similarly, the volume of Am decreases exponentially. This is
known as the convex geometry due to Grunbaum. It states that every hyperplane passing
through ξm divides A into two parts such that the volume of each of these parts is less
than the fraction 1− (1/e) of the volume of convex body A [45].
Last but not least, the method of circumscribed ellipsoids of Numirovski-Yudin-Shor was
formulated based on the geometric of an ellipsoid. The method of circumscribed ellipsoids
states that half ellipsoid is an ellipsoid of smaller volume than the initial ellipsoid [69, 70].
To make reference, let an ellipsoid circumscribed about A as E0 and its centre as c0. If
c0 lies outside A then the half space does not contain any points of A. Thus, the half
of the ellipsoid that does not interact with A can be eliminated. However, if c0 ∈ A,
then f
′
(c0) can be computed by method of central section which results in E0
′
. Then,
the minimisation of the convex functions is obtained by circumscribing about the E0
′
.
Although the method of circumscribed ellipsoid has inferior rate of convergence compared
to the method of central section, it eliminate the need for finding centres of gravity of
polyhedrons [41].
Thus, from the three outlined convex optimisation methods the general form of the convex
optimisation problem can be reduced to algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 convex optimisation
Require: θa+ (1− θ)b ∈ C






Where the vector x = x1, ....., xn is the optimisation variable of the problem and the
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Figure 4.1: (a)Convex set and (b) nonconvex set
function f0 : Rn → R is the objective function. The functions fi : Rn → R for i = 1, ...,m
are the inequality constraint functions. In addition, constants bi = b1, ...., bm are the
bounds for the constraints. Furthermore, equality constraints gi(x) and its bounds ai
may be included. Thus, a vector x∗ is an optimal solution of the problem {minf0(x)}, if
it has the smallest objective value among all vectors that satisfy the constraints. This is
true for any z with f1(z) ≤ b1, ......, fm(z) ≤ bm and f0(z) ≥ f0(x∗).
Convex optimisation is only applicable for convex function or sets. Thus, a set is defined
to be convex if and only if any two elements a and b within a set can be joint together
by a straight line as demonstrated in Figure 4.1. Mathematically, a set C is convex
if θa+ (1− θ)b ∈ C holds for θ ∈ [0, 1]. Convex optimisation is a prominent solution
because it guarantees strong duality and global optimality for submodular set functions.
Transport problems are discrete in nature. Moreover, the closing time of rail-road
level crossings catering for heterogeneous traffic planning exhibits submodularity and
supermodularity properties. The convex optimisation’s effectiveness and fast computation
make it ideal to apply in the level crossing closing time problem.
4.2 Mathematical Modelling
The train’s longitudinal force model is crucial in understanding the heterogeneity and
dynamics of the railway traffic at the level crossings. The train force model consists of
the traction force denoted by Ft which propels the train in the forward direction. The
opposing forces includes the braking force (Fb), resistive force due to the curvature of the
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rail (Fc), aerodynamic drag (Fr) and gravity (Fw). According to Newton’s second law of




= ΣF = Ft − Fb − Fr − Fc − Fw (4.11)
Where:
M - total train’s inertial mass,
v - velocity of the train,
Ft - tractive force propelling forward motion,
Fb - braking force,
Fr- resistive force due to the rail contact with the train axles,
Fc - resistance due to curvature of the rail,
Fw - resistive force due to the weight of the train.
The traction force for the commuter train is derived from 3kV overhead wires. However,
intercity and freight locomotive derive traction from converting diesel into propulsion
energy. According to [76], traction force derived from the one-axle vehicle model can be





Where: µt is the tractive force coefficient.
The basic resistance force due to the contact of the train axles and rail is calculated by
Davis equation 4.13.
Fr = co + cvv + cav
2 (4.13)
Where: co, cv and ca are the coefficients. Whereby co represents axle to rail rolling
friction and cv represents mechanical resistance from the shaft rotation and transmission
chain dominant at the low travel speed [58]. Aerodynamic resistance is represented by
coefficient ca which has greater impact at high travel speed.
The train is subjected to curvature resistance generated from the train’s resistance to
the curvature of the rail formation. Curvature resistance force is dependent on the track
characteristics, as shown in equation 4.14. As a result, the rail wear and tear is caused








r is the radius of the rail’s curvature,
D is a coefficient of the value between 500 to 1200. However, in this study D = 500 is
adopted.
Force of gravity denoted in equation 4.15, generates weight resistance on a train as it
travel on a gradient surface.
Fw = Mg cos θ (4.15)
All trains considered in this study are assumed to use pneumatic braking system thus











Where: n is the number brake discs,
Ps and Pd are the clamping force on a brake shoe and pad respectively,
rm is the medium friction radius,
µs is the friction coefficient between the brake shoes wheel treads,
µd is the friction coefficient between the brake pad wheel discs,
Do is the wheel diameter.
As a result of the law of conservation of energy, the integral of the braking force over the











Where:Lb is the braking distance,
m is the mass of train wheels,
v is the train speed.
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Figure 4.2: Train motion characteristics at the level crossing








To simplify the model, resistance forces are combined to form a net resistive forceR(v, r, θ)
which is dependent on the velocity of the train (v), rail curvature radius (r) and the rail




= Ft(v)−R(v, r, θ)− Fb(v) (4.19)
The ideal train movement follows a unique pattern at the rail-road level crossings. Hence,
Figure 4.2 illustrates the desired train movements as it enters and exits the level crossing.
The train can travel at maximum line speed along the network provided that the signalling
(signals on green) and rail curvature permits. However, cautious driving is advised on
the encounter of the signals displaying yellow as this implies that the next signal is
at red. Therefore, at the rail-road level crossing the train must decelerate between S1
and S0 provided that there are no points machines within the block. This is because
the protecting signal (S0) only clears when the its approach track (ta) is occupied.
Henceforth, slowing down of the train allows for the train to pass the level crossing
at he required speed restriction (vr). Moreover, the train should ideally be on coasting
mode when traversing over the rail-road level crossing area. Finally, the train should
accelerate as it exits the deactivation track.
Three modes of train driving are deduced based on the illustrations in Figure 4.2.The
train’s tractive and braking efforts are controlled by the train driver. Hence, train is on
braking mode when Fb > 0 and Ft = 0. In contrast, the train is in powering (acceleration)
mode when Fb = 0 and Ft > 0. Coasting is achieved when both Fb and Ft are zero.




Table 4.1: Force and velocity conditions for the train’s driving modes
Driving mode Net forces Velocity
Acceleration Ft(v)−R(v, r, θ)− Fb(v) > 0 0 ≤ v ≤ vmax
Constant speed Ft(v)−R(v, r, θ)− Fb(v) = 0 v ≥ vmax
Deceleration Ft(v)−R(v, r, θ)− Fb(v) < 0 0 ≤ v ≤ vmax
Stop Ft(v)−R(v, r, θ)− Fb(v) = 0 v = 0
Heterogeneous railway traffic considered in this study comprises of the commuter, intercity
and freight trains. Properties of the commuter, intercity and freight trains are listed in
Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, respectively. Commuter trains are mainly reserved for
passenger transport services within an urban or metropolitan area. They are characterised
by high dispatching rate and frequent stops compared to freight trains. In addition,
commuter trains considered in the study uses electric traction of 11kV alternation voltage
at 50Hz from overhead wires. However, the intercity and freight trains use diesel-electric
traction system because they operate over the longest railway network. Hence, in the case
of intercity and freight trainskm traction force is derived from the conversion of diesel to
propulsion energy.
Table 4.2: Characteristics of a commuter train
Parameter Symbol Value
Train mass M 45000kg
Train length L 275m





Max traction Tmax 120kN
Max braking Bmax 72kN
Friction coefficient co 1.0×10−3Nkg−1








Traction coefficient µt 0.80
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Table 4.3: Characteristics of an intercity train
Parameter Symbol Value
Train mass M 450000kg
Train length L 375m





Max traction Tmax 150kN
Max braking Bmax 86kN
Friction coefficient co 5.0×10−3Nkg−1








Traction coefficient µt 0.7
Table 4.4: Characteristics of a freight train
Parameter Symbol Value
Train mass M 45000000kg
Locomotive length L 450m





Max traction Tmax 250kN
Max braking Bmax 150kN
Friction coefficient co 7.0×10−3Nkg−1








Traction coefficient µt 0.65
4.3 Level Crossing System
Rail-road level crossing is an open loop control system whereby the controller input is the
occupation status of the track sections involved. The occupation status is determined by
the axle counter evaluator based on the comparison of the measured induced voltage on
the axle counters relative to the threshold voltage. Therefore, the axle counters evaluator
is continuously monitoring the induced voltage on the receiver coil of the involved track
sections. Thus, the protection system is actuated when the induced voltage on the first
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axle counter of the activation track is less than the threshold voltage. This completes
the process of securing the rail-road level crossing for the train to pass safely and the
controller keeps the state until next change in input. Henceforth, the controller withdraws
the protection system when the measured induced voltage on the last axle counter of the
deactivation track exceeds the threshold voltage. The explained process in convex set
since no other activities can coincide at point in time.
The controller has no capability to ensure minimal level crossing closing time. Moreover,
it has no means of distinguishing which type of train is passing over the rail-road level
crossing. Therefore, it is ideal to implement the optimisation of the closing time for the
rail-road level crossing system at the traffic management layer not at the controller layer.
The railway traffic management contains the identification token or number associated
with the train, its departure and arrival time and location. Furthermore, the optimiser
can be extended to incorporate the property of the trains to be dispatched and their
anticipated time spent at each rail-road level crossing system. Lastly, the anticipated
time spent at the level crossing and the required driving regime can be made available
on cab. Transport planning optimisation problems are discrete. Thus, variables applied
are described in subsection 4.3.1 and shall be adopted throughout this chapter.
4.3.1 Variables
Velocity is an integral of acceleration thus in discrete form it is the summation of
the product of acceleration intervals and infinitesimal time, as shown in equation 4.20.
Similarly, displacement is the integral of velocity, denoted in equation 4.21. The train’s
acceleration can be represented as a quotient of the net force acting on the train over the
total mass in accordance with Using Newton’s 2nd law of motion, as shown in equation
4.22. Train’s velocity, displacement and time are expressed in equation 4.23, 4.24 and























vk+1 = vk + ak(tk+1 − tk) (4.23)
sk+1 = sk + vk(tk+1 − tk) (4.24)










Current rail traffic control system utilise positive train control strategy thus, proposed
optimisation method is limited to the positive train control (PTC). The positive train
control is a communication based train control which provides trajectory features of
trains in the railway network to the traffic operators and other trains within the same
network. The PTC has different layers of deployment however it’s fundamental principle
is bidirectional communication between the central control area, trains and trackside
equipment, as shown in Figure 4.3. The railway traffic is operated according to the
timetable which is updated in the case of delays. However, train schedule is guided by
the railway network’s headway. It is imperative to formulate the optimisation solution
around the headway since the presence of the level crossing may inadvertently introduce
delays in the rail traffic.
As already stated, minimisation of the rail-road level crossing time amid heterogeneous
traffic is a convex optimisation problem. In order to solve this problem, the illustrations
made in Figure 4.2 and the driving regime defined in Table 4.1 are applied. Hence, the
solution is segmented according to the train braking on the approach, coasting through
and acceleration on the exit of the rail-road level crossing. Minimising the time spent by
the train in each of three defined cruise conditions will yield an optimal rail-road level
crossing time. The problem discussed is discrete, thus assuming that ta in Figure 4.2 has
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Figure 4.3: Positive Train Control
N increments and td increments starts from N+1 to M. Therefore, the objective variable
tk at interval k is the time spent by train within the defined segment of the rail-road
level crossing. Furthermore, the objective variable tk is a function of the distance sk and
train’s velocity vk as per equation 4.24 and it is nonnegative.
In the segment where the train enter the activation track, convex optimisation can be
posed as shown in 2. This holds if and only if sufficient braking distance can be achieved
in this block section. The time spent in this block tk
(1) and the headway time th are
elements in the convex set C. Thus, tk
(1) is constrained by the resultant force, level
crossing speed restrictions and headway time. The resultant force must be less than zero
in addition the final train’s velocity at the end of the block should not exceed the level
crossing speed restriction. Furthermore, tk
(1) should be kept below the headway time th
to ensure that railway traffic capacity is not affected.
Algorithm 2 Minimisation of the time spent over the activation block
Require: θ(tk
(1)) + (1− θ)th ∈ C
Ensure: θ ∈ [0, 1]
tk








Ft(vk)−R(vk, r, θ)− Fb(vk) ≤ 0
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The algorithm defined in 3 minimises the time spent by trains across the level crossing
area tk
(2). However, in this block the resultant force should be zero. The train’s velocity
must be kept below the imposed speed restriction and the time spent must be a fraction
of the headway time. Lastly, the train should accelerate as it exits the deactivation track
td thus algorithm 4 applies. The minimisation of the time spent on the level crossing
exit tk
(3) is subjected to the resultant force greater than zero. Thus, train’s velocity
is constrained to the maximum line speed and the train must take at least 15% of the
headway time. Refer to 4.3.3 for detailed review of the constraints applied.
Algorithm 3 Minimisation the time spent over the level crossing area
Require: θ(tk
(2)) + (1− θ)th ∈ C
Ensure: θ ∈ [0, 1]
tk

















The optimal time spent at the rail-road level crossing is the sum of the time spent by the
train over the activation and deactivation track as well as the train’s exit time. Since,
each train type has unique characteristics hence optimisation should be in accordance
each train’s capabilities. Thus, optimal level crossing given in 4.27 is the sum of the time





Algorithm 4 Minimisation of the exit time from the level crossing
Require: θ(tk
(3) + (1− θ)th ∈ C
Ensure: θ ∈ [0, 1]
tk








Ft(vk)−R(vk, r, θ)− Fb(vk) ≥ 0
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Figure 4.4: Headway time between two trains
4.3.3 Constraints
The rail-road level crossing closing time is constraint by the headway time, speed restriction,
minimum and maximum permissible closing time. The time interval between two successive
trains travelling in the same direction is referred to headway time and it used as railway
traffic capacity measure. Different types of railway headways exist however the one used
in the study is derived based on the depiction in Figure 4.4. Thus, headway time is the
time at which the second train can depart S1 if the first train has passed signal S0 and
overlap (OL). This assumes that the two trains are the same type and are travelling at
the maximum line speed (v) over the headway distance h. Thus, headway time (th) is




(d+ L+OL) + taa (4.28)
Where: taa is the acceleration time and d is the distance between the departure and
destination signal.
Furthermore, the train’s velocity is constrained by factors such as curvature of the rail,
blocked signal, turnout (point machine) and the rail-road level crossing. Therefore, train’s
velocity profile takes the form presented in equation 4.29.
vt ≤ vmax = min{vc, vb, vp, vlx} (4.29)
Where: vt is the train’s velocity,
vmax is the maximum line speed,
vc is the speed limit due to the railway line curvature,
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vb is the speed limit due to the blocked signal,
vp is the speed limit due to turnout over the point machine,
vlx is the speed limit due to the level crossing.
The shortest and longest permissible level crossing closing time depends on the activation
point and imposed speed restriction (vlx) due to the level crossing. Activation point is
determined by the maximum braking distance of the railway traffic given by equation
4.30. The solution proposed involves heterogeneous railway traffic therefore Table 4.5
lists braking distance of each train type for various speed restrictions. Line speed in this
case is vmax = 90km/h. However, for freight train maximum speed is vmax = 75km/h as
stipulated in its specifications. Hence, based on the braking distances presented in Table
4.5 the signal S1 has to be placed at least 625m away from S0 for speed restriction
(0.5vmax ≤ v ) or (v ≤ 0.33vmax). Moreover, activation point can be 315m from S0






sB is the braking distance,
vmax = 32.4m/s is the line speed with an exception for the freight train(27m/s),
vlx is the level crossing speed restriction,
ad is the train deceleration.
Table 4.5: Braking distance for heterogeneous railway traffic
Train type vlx = 0.75vmax vlx = 0.5vmax vlx = 0.33vmax vlx = 0.25vmax
Commuter 270m 463m 549m 579m
Intercity 306m 525m 622m 656m




The optimisation solution is carried out on Matlab platform using the CVX package for
specifying and solving convex programs [77]. Two solution architectures shown in Figure
4.5 and Figure 4.6 are proposed. Architecture presented in Figure 4.5 applies for rail-road
level crossings with zero dwell time whereas Figure 4.6 applies for level crossings with
nonzero dwell time. The latter is designed for the rail-road level crossings with platform
at or in close proximity to the activation point.
The solution for zero dwell time shown in Figure 4.5 begins with monitoring the train
upon occupying the approach track t1 of signal S1 or the track before the activation point
depending on the topology. This is followed by command to initiate braking in order to
adjust the train’s speed to reach the required speed restriction. Convex optimisation is
applied to determine the adjust the speed taking into account the imposed level crossing
speed restriction, as outlined in algorithm 2.
The rail-road level crossing protection system gets activated upon the occupation of the
approach track of the protecting signal S0 denoted by t0. It is imperative that the
train keep to a speed at least 0.8vlx in order to ensure minimal level crossing closing
time. Therefore, command the train’s velocity is adjusted accordingly as it travel past
the activation point. This serves as the pre-coasting conditions. Similarly, the rail-road
level crossing deactivates the protection system as soon as deactivation track is cleared.
The railway traffic will have full control over the rail-road level crossing within the time
interval between the activation and deactivation. The algorithm for determining the
optimal level crossing closing time (tlx) is outlined in algorithms above.
However, the solution for the rail-road level crossings with nonzero dwell time requires
that activation be delayed by the minimum dwell time. This delay is only effective
when the train come to a stop at the platform. Minimum dwell time shall be estimated
beforehand based on peak times and passenger statistics. In addition, the maximum level
crossing closure time is to be extended to 0.75th in order to accommodate the required
deceleration and acceleration time.
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Figure 4.5: Solution architecture for the level crossing zero dwell time
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The convex optimisation algorithm developed has two architectures, one for zero dwell
time and the other for nonzero dwell time. Data collected from the level crossings under
study is used to train the developed convex optimisation. Thus, the dataset of 6000
samples was collected from the eight level crossings on the southern corridor of the
Western Cape metro rail. Furthermore, the data is split into 5000 and 1000 samples
for training and testing the algorithm, respectively. First, data analysis is used to extract
the model of the features with influence on the level crossing closing time as per findings
of 3. The features include dwell time, train’s speed and time delay imposed on the
protecting signal.
Regression techniques are applied to model the relationship between the dwell time,
train’s entry, protecting signal’s time delay and traffic heterogeneity and the level crossing
closing time. Training data of 5000 samples was used to derive the model in python. Dwell
time is the occupancy time of the track sections which are part of the station’s platform.
The train’s speed is estimated from the distance-time relation of the activation track.
Moreover, time delay imposed on the level crossing’s protection signal is inferred from
the time at which the approach track was occupied until the signal in question normalises.
Linear regression presented less bias and variance hence the parameters of the model are
shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Linear regression model {hθ(xi) = θ0 + θ1xi} for i = 1, 2, 3.
Feature θ0 θ1 J(θ)
Dwell time 0.992 1.001 0.002
Train’s speed -0.135 -0.036 0.025
Time delay 0.202 0.298 0.024
Since, the level crossing compartment is separated into blocks as per driving regimes
outlined above. First, algorithm presented in 2 is applied to determine the minimum
closing time at activation block. The time spent at activation is influenced by the dwell
time x1, train’s speed x2 and time delay imposed on the signal x3 hence the objective
function reduces to 4.31 and the following constraints. Furthermore, the only feature
affecting the time spent along and on exit of the deactivation track is the train’s speed
x2. Therefore, objective function algorithm 3 and 4 still hold with vk changed to x2. The
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+ x1 + x3} (4.31)
subject to

arg min(hθ(x1)) ≤ td
arg max (hθ(x2)) ≥ vlx
arg min(hθ(x3)) ≤ ti
Ft(vk)−R(vk, r, θ)− Fb(vk) ≤ 0
Where:
td is 10% of the anticipted station’s dwell time,
vlx is the level crossing speed restriction assigned to 30km/h,
ti is the time delay on the protecting system which is limited to average driver reaction
time 2s.
The results obtained on training the convex algorithm developed are presented in Figure
4.7 and Figure 4.8. The current time spent at the level crossing (level crossing closing
time) per train trip and the presented solution results for the zero and nonzero dwell
time is shown in Figure 4.7. In addition, cumulative sum of the level crossing closing
time was evaluated and results thereof is depicted in Figure 4.8. Thus, performance of
the current and convex optimisation solution is measured by the cummulative sum of the
level crossing over test iterations. The area bounded by the cumulative sum of the level
crossing closing time per test iteration curve and the anticipated permissible closing time
is used to compare the performance of the existing and presented solution.
The ratio of cummulative sum of the level crossing closing time per test iteration for
optimal and existing solution is evaluated. The ratio is 0.468 for the zero dwell time and
0.375 for the nonzero dwell time is obtained. The obtained ratio of 0.468 implies that
convex optimisation can reduce the level crossing closing time by 53.2% for the zero dwell
time. Moreover, 0.375 translate to 62.46% closing time reduction for the nonzero dwell
time. The optimisation solution show superior performance against the existing solution
therefore it is imperative to evaluate it s performance relative to the permissible (ideal)
closing time. Thus, results presented in Figure 4.7 indicates that optimisation algorithm
converges to very close to the maximal permissible closing time. The optimal closing time
for the zero dwell time is almost equivalent to required closing time over time. However,
the optimal closing time for the nonzero dwell time does not converge to global optima.
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(a) The average closing time for level crossing
with zero dwell time
(b) The average closing time for level crossing
with nonzero dwell time
Figure 4.7: Level crossing closing time per test iterations
(a) Cumulative sum of closing time for level
crossing with zero dwell time
(b) Cumulative sum of closing time for level
crossing with nonzero dwell time
Figure 4.8: Cumulative sum of the closing time per test iterations
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This is attributed to the approximation of dwell time hence a greedy algorithm can be
applied to minimise the perturbations. The actual safety and capacity improvement shall
be validated in section 5.
4.6 Conclusion
The convex optimisation solution for the level crossing closing time under heterogeneous
railway traffic has been presented. Furthermore, two solution architectures were proposed
for the zero and nonzero dwell time. The algorithm is built using a cvx solver which is
a Matlab based package for solving discplined convex programs. Thus, optimal level
crossing closing time is attained by optimising the time spent by train entering the
activation point, along and on the exit of the deactivation track. The minimal time
spent on the defined compartment of the level crossings corresponds train driving regime
within these compartment. In addition, the features influencing the level crossing closing
time have been applied on the optimisation algorithm. The algorithm showed impressive
performance against the existing solution. The cummulative sum of the level crossing
closing time over the test iterations indicates that the presented solution reduces the
closing time by 53.2% and 62.46% for the zero and nonzero dwell time, respectively.
Moreover, the closing time for the zero dwell time converges to maximal permissible
closing time. However, the nonzero dwell time have opposite effect thus a greedy algorithm




This chapter presents validation of the solution. A brief overview of validation is discussed
in section 5.1. The solution presented is aimed at safety and capacity improvement at
the level crossings. Thus, validation of safety improvement and capacity improvement
are outlined in section 5.2. Concluding remarks are made in section 5.3.
5.1 Introduction
Railway systems are subjected to rigorous validation and verification in accordance with
CENELEC standards EN 50126, EN 50128 and EN 50129 [14, 16, 17]. CENELEC EN
50126 details the system’s reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS)
requirements and processes [16, 72]. However, EN 50128 are the specifications for certifying
software for railway control and protection systems applied in communication and signalling
systems [17, 72]. Lastly, EN 50129 are the specifications for the certifying safety related
electronic system in railway communication, signalling and processing systems [14, 72].
However, due to time constraints and improvise have been made.
Hence, safety improvement is validated based on the time lost at the rail-road level
crossing per train trip. Comparative analysis of the current and presented solution is
conducted based on time lost at the level crossing per train trip. Chapter 3 has confirmed
that one of the contributors to transit bottlenecks in the railway network is the presence
of rail-road level crossings. Thus, traffic capacity refers to critical bottlenecks sections in
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a given duration of the train trip [24, 26]. Therefore, capacity consumption is used in
validation of the critical bottlenecks due to level crossing.
5.2 Validation: Safety & Capacity
Validation of safety and capacity improvement of the presented solution is detailed
in subsection 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, respectively. System and user safety are two different
parameters which need to complement each other to ensure overall safety at the rail-road
level crossing. Thus, time lost at the rail-road level crossing encompasses both. Capacity
is a broad subject but in this case it is limited to traffic bottlenecks in the railway network.
Hence, capacity comsumption of routes over the level crossings is used validation purpose.
Data collected from the eight level crossings under study is used and heterogeneous traffic
data is simulated.
5.2.1 Safety
Validation of safety improvement is conducted offline on the recorded level crossing’s
closing times. The level crossing closing time is equivalent to the time spent by trains at
the level crossing. Thus, time spent at the level crossing per train trip is computed for each
level crossing under study. Data is populated into a probability density function (pdf).
Hence, a pdf of the time spent at the rail-road level crossing per train trip is expressed
in equation 5.1 with mean µ and standard deviation σ derived from the dataset. The
expected pdf (g(x)) is populated from the closing time, taking into account parameters
such as dwell time, train’s speed and protecting signal’s time delay. The expected pdf
has mean (µe) and standard deviation (σe). In addition, threshold closing time takes into











The expected time spent at the rail-road level crossing (g(x)) is given by equation 5.2.
Thus, time lost at the rail-road level crossing per train trip is represented by the area
R bounded by the threshold rail-road level crossing’s closing time, actual and expected
pdfs, as shown in Figure 5.2, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.3.
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Thus, time lost at the rail-road level crossing is obtained by computing numerical or
analytical integration of the functions. The time lost at the level crossing is computed
for the existing and presented solution. Therefore, comparative analysis of the time lost



























xt = Tthreshold which is the maximum permissible closing time,
xi is the point of intersection f(x) = g(x).
Results
Safety improvement is assessed using the cross-validation dataset of 1000 samples from
the eight level crossings. Thus, probability distribution of the time lost at the level
crossing is depicted in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. The actual, expected and
optimal pdfs of the time lost at the level crossing is indicated in red, blue and green ,
respectively. The level crossing with maximum permissible closing time of 60s, 100s and
260s are considered.
Thus, it can be noted that distribution of level crossings with expected closing time below
100s (shown in Figure 5.1 and 5.2) are more skewed to the right than those with a higher
expected closing time. Therefore, the optimisation is able to perfrom very well under this
conditions thus shifting the distribution more towards the left. However, the optimisation
is not as robust for the level crossing with the higher expected closing time (Figure 5.3).
This is attributed to the dwell time approximation based on the anticipated value.
It is notable that the presented solution can achieve over 50% reduction in the time
lost at the level crossing, as shown in Table 5.1. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the
optimisation algorithm is not the same for each level crossing. This suggests that there
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the time spent at the level crossing tavg ≈ 60s
Figure 5.2: Distribution of the time spent at the level crossing tavg ≈ 100s
Figure 5.3: Distribution of the time spent at the level crossing tavg ≈ 260s
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may be other features or attributes affecting the closing time other than those considered.
Table 5.1: Time lost at the level crossing: Actual vs Optimal.
Level crossing Line Tthreshold (s) Actual time lost(%) Optimal time lost(%)
Albertyn Rd 1 339.7 0.3167 0.0917241
Albertyn Rd 2 335.5 0.36776 0.091724
Austell Rd 1 62.9735 0.4156 0.130112
Austell Rd 2 105.4486 0.3185 0.124916
Kalkbay Rd 1 247.1851 0.4224 0.134877
Kalkbay Rd 2 274.2234 0.5774 0.14215
Military Rd 1 290.8561 0.6367 0.132279
Military Rd 2 97.4201 0.5786 0.133427
Uxbridge Rd 1 74.7672 0.28515 0.134619
Uxbridge Rd 2 60.7218 0.6131 0.134535
White Rd 1 160.1119 0.5364 0.134398
White Rd 2 156.6326 0.6123 0.132985
York Rd 1 206.0263 0.4035 0.134715
York Rd 2 206.9100 0.4044 0.134931
The application of convex optimisation result in the optimal solution indicated in green in
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. Thus, presented solution achieves an average time loss between
9% and 14% margins from 30% to 60% on the current solution. Hence, on average the
presented solution is validated to reduce the time lost at the level crossing by at least
50%. The cross validation test scored lower than the training data which reported about
62.46% improvement nonetheless the algorithm performs very well.
5.2.2 Capacity
Capacity is measured by the critical bottlenecks due to the rail-road level crossings in the
network. Thus, headway timeth, minimum cycle time (MCT) and capacity consumption
(Cap) are used as measures of the capacity improvement. The minimum cycle time refers
to the minimum time required to run trains conflict-free in a network [23]. Thus, MCT
is calculated for all the level crossings in the corridor and it is the time spent at all level
crossing per trip. Similarly, capacity consumption is the ratio between the minimum
cycle time and planned cycle time in hourly basis. The headway time is calculated as
defined in 4.3.3.
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Results
Comparative analysis of the capacity of the level crossing’s routes is shown in Table 5.2.
The commuter train data is collected from interlocking system whilst the intercity and
freight train data is derived from the train driving simulator. Furthemore, traffic capacity
is evaluated on 2 hours iterations and the results presented in Table 5.2 are the maximum
value for all considered traffic.
Table 5.2: Level crossing capacity analysis.
Time of day
Current solution Presented solution
th MCT Cap th MCT Cap
04:00:00 141.578s 707.801s 0.1966 98.722s 592.32s 0.165
06:00:00 185.560s 1135.627 0.315 118.341s 823.39s 0.230
08:00:00 169.133s 1353.064s 0.376 107.337s 915.083s 0.254
10:00:00 123.545s 803.043s 0.223 99.127s 693.889s 0.192
12:00:00 158.699s 953.194s 0.264 104.875s 734.125s 0.204
14:00:00 111.461s 780.227s 0.216 91.785s 651.192s 0.180
16:00:00 328.129s 2096.903s 0.638 150.065s 981.762s 0.272
18:00:00 208.753s 1610.024s 0.419 116.871s 794.730s 0.221
20:00:00 197.431s 1481.733s 0.412 104.492s 754.118s 0.209
22:00:00 123.957s 619.785s 0.172 85.194s 504.210s 0.140
The presented results indicate that solution provide at least 15% improvement in capacity
under normal conditions. Generally, headway time and minimum cycle time are the
worst at peak time but the presented solution is able to at least achieve 27% capacity
improvement. However, where capacity is severely compromised an improvement of at
most 58% can be attained. Furthermore, the current level crossing solution has an average
0.3 capacity consumption at peak time compared to 0.2 on the presented solution. This
indicate the fraction of an hour allocated per each train trip in the same line and direction.
Thus, current solution allows at most 3 trains to be dispatched travelling in the same
line and direction on an houly basis. Yet, the presented solution is able to accomodate
5 trains on an hourly basis. Thus, an additional 40% dispatch rate is regained. The
improvement in capacity implies that the train travel time is reduced. Furthermore, the
capacity regained can be distributed to the road traffic thus increasing the opening time
of the level crossing. Lastly, the results presented reflects the heterogeneous railway traffic




Safety and capacity improvement of the presented solution has been validated. Safety at
the rail-road level crossings is often compromised by long closing duration. Therefore,
safety is validated by comparative analysis of the time lost at the rail-road level crossings.
Current rail-road level crossings system have an average 30% to 60% of time loss compared
to 9% to 14% time loss under the presented optimal solution. Overall, the presented
solution allows for at most 50% recovery of the time lost at the level crossings. However,
the solution is not uniform throughout all level crossings thus suggesting that there could
be other features affecting the closing time other than those considered. In addition,
capacity is validated by headway time, minimum cycle time and capacity consumption of
routes over the level crossings. The presented solution can improve capacity of heterogene-
ous traffic by at least 15% under normal condition. Moreover, the it has been validated
that at most 58% improvement is possible where capacity is severely compromised.
Furthermore, the solution has been proven to maintain good capacity at peak times




This chapter provides a summary of the outcomes, contributions and recommendations
of the study. Thus, outcomes of the study are discussed in section 6.1, followed by the
research’s contributions in section 6.2. Lastly, recommendations and future works are
presented in section 6.3.
6.1 Research outcomes
The presented study was aimed at optimising the level crossing closing time in a heterogen-
eous railway traffic. Hence, optimal closing time was directed towards improving safety
and capacity at the rail-road level crossings. The optimisation solution was achieved in
several steps. Firstly, data analysis was conducted to determine spatial, temporal and
behavioural features with highest influene on the level crossing’s safety and capacity. The
data used was collected from the eight level crossings found along the southern corridor
of the Western Cape metro rail. The identified spatial features were further classified
into road-based and rail-based. Thus, rail-based spatial features proved to have greater
impact on the closing time than the road-based features. In addition, analysis indicated
that the presence of platform at or in close proximity to the activation has the greatest
impact above all spatial features. However, the general trend with other spatial features
is that their impact on level crossing capacity is likely to be significant under degraded
mode of operation.
Furthermore, temporal analysis revealed that irregularities in dwell time have a significant
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impact on the level crossing’s closing time. Inconsistent passenger flow rate at a specific
station or halt result in irregular dwell time. In addition, temporal analysis indicated that
trains approaching the level crossing from a scheduled stop take longer to clear the level
crossing. Likewise, time delays imposed on protecting signals tend to extend the rail-road
level crossing’s closing time. The impact on the level crossing safety and capacity is severe
when dwell time and time delay on the protecting signal co-exist. Lastly, it was shown
that manned active level crossing tends to have long average closing time. The cascade
of human intervention required to successfully complete level crosssing operation results
in long closing time.
Conversely, the study has deduced that long waiting time tends to perpetuate unsafe
human behaviour at the rail-road level crossing to some degree. Behavioural analysis
indicated that systemic processes reinforce compliance particularly within the railway
transportation. However, the efficiency of the railway systemic process decreases in a
manned active rail-road level crossing. Thus, multiplier effect on the reaction time of the
operator and train driver extends the level crossing time. Railway transportation has
limited control over road users. Therefore, present study has shown that motorists are
most responsive to barrier methods compared to flashing lights. Moreover, cyclists and
pedestrians showed reduced responsiveness to both light and barrier warning systems.
Yet, completely barricading the rail-road level crossing system reinforces safe behaviour
for both pedestrians and cyclists.
Optimal rail-road level crossing closing time was achieved through the application of
convex optimisation on the time spent by the train from activation to deactivation point.
Thus, convex optimisation technique was formulated based on dwell time, protecting
signal’s time delay, train speed, train’s traction and braking characteristics. Heterogeneous
railway traffic included passenger, intercity and freight trains. Since, train follows at most
three driving regimes over the level crossing then optimal closing time is guaranteed if and
only if the time spent in each regime is minimised. Therefore, driving regimes involved
train braking on the approach of the activation point, coasting over the level crossing
area and accelerating on the exit of the deactivation point. Moreover, constraints such as
resultant longitudinal force, headway time, speed restrictions, minimum and maximum
level closing time were factored in the algorithm.
Two solution architectures were proposed for the rail-road level crossing with zero and
non-zero dwell time. The latter solution imposed an additional time delay equivalent to an
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estimate of dwell time on the activation of the level crossing. Matlab based CVX packages
for solving convex programs was used to implement the solution. The algorithm showed
remarkable performance against the existing solution. The results show that algorithm
reduced the time lost at the level crossings by 53.2% and 62.46% for zero and nonzero
dwell time, respectively. In addition, closing time for the zero dwell time converged to
maximal permissible closing time but the nonzero dwell time converges to suboptimas.
Thus, a greedy algorithm is recommended for estimation of the dwell time.
Validation methods were presented to check safety and capacity improvement of the
presented solution. Thus, safety improvement was validated through comparative analysis
of the time lost at the rail-road level crossing. This study has shown that the current
rail-road level crossings has 30% to 60% time loss per train trip compared to 9% to 14%
time loss on the presented solution. Furthermore, validation show that presented solution
can achieve at most 50% recovery of the time lost at the level crossings. In addition, rail-
road level crossing capacity has been checked by headway time, minimum cycle time and
capacity consumption. The presented solution achieved at least 15% improvement in
capacity under normal conditions. However, the results showed capacity improvement of
at least 27% at peak times with a potential to reach 58% in case where capacity is severely
compromised. Lastly, the presented solution can regain an additional 40% dispatch rate.
6.2 Research Contributions
The present study has made the following contributions:
• The present study has contributed to the existing literature in the field of data
analysis and extraction of features with highest impact on the level crossing closing
time. Furthermore, the study has bridged the gap in the application of convex
optimisation techniques to level crossing safety and capacity problem. Moreover,
the study has demonstrated the significance of data centric design, optimisation and
validation approaches on system with socio-technical and safety critical duality.
• The study has shown the applicability of convex optimisation in heterogeneous
railway traffic. Moreover, feasibility of having rail-road level crossings in a shared
railway network has been demonstrated.
• Lastly, this study contributed towards the improvement of positive train control




A novel optimisation solution for the rail-road level crossing closing time for heterogeneous
railway traffic has been presented. The presented solution has proven to reduce the
waiting time and increase traffic capacity at the rail-road level crossing however the
following improvements can be made:
• The presented solution fall short for the level crossings with non-zero dwell time.
The solution imposed delay on the level crossing activation by an estimated dwell
time. However, the estimated dwell time is derived from the anticipated passenger
volume rather than the actual passenger volume at a time of the day. It is inherently
difficult to provide accurate estimate of the dwell time and let alone manage it.
Hence, the solution is limited by the inability to accurately estimates dwell time.
Thus, future works can be focused on the estimation and management of the dwell
time. Current research in dwell time explores monitoring the passenger flow rate
at the station‘s platform and on the train using CCTV cameras. Hence, artificial
intelligence techniques can be used to provide an accurate estimate of the dwell
time in real time.
• Rail-road level crossing systems like any other safety critical element in railway
transportation are limited by operating the system under degraded mode. Thus,
degraded mode of operation occurs when the system fails to meet the expected
level of services such as failure of the wayside track elements or communication
breakdown. The presented solution is limited by degraded mode of operations in a
form of loss of train detection of the activation or deactivation track sections, failure
on the level crossing’s protection or warning system, failure of signals involved in
level crossing operation. Hence, inability to detect the train at the activation or
deactivation track section will not trigger or withdraw the level crossing’s protection
system autonomously. As a result, human intervention and potential delays on the
rail and road traffic are inevitable. In addition, malfunction of the rail-road level
crossing’s protection system implies that there is a need for human intervention to
ensure safe operation. This introduces additional delay but once the pre-activation
conditions for the rail-road level crossing are met the presented solution can still be
applied. The failure of the LED cluster on the signals implies that the driver will
depart at precautious speed when comfortable to do so. In this case, delay cannot
be quantified as it varies per individual driver. Degraded mode differs on the failed
element or module involved in the rail-road level crossing operation. Therefore,
improvement can be made on devising the safety model for the present solution
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under degraded mode of operation in addition failure modes can be identified so
that contingency plan can be devised.
• Future work can look into finding the computational architecture or model which
allows the solution to be integrated into the railway management system using
positive train control in real time. Lastly, the solution can be improved by increasing
the database of trains since the present study considered only three types of trains;
intercity, passenger and freight train.
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